TO

THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH

NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS IN BERLIN

WHO CONTINUE TO FULFILL WITH HONOR

ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT JOURNALISTIC

ASSIGNMENTS OF POST-WAR TIMES

NAZI
MEANS WAR

by

LELAND STOWE

WHITTLESEY HOUSE
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FOREWORD

FOR THE SAKE OF THE RECORD—

THIS small volume is the result of two months of unremitting journalistic enquiry in Adolf Hitler's new Germany. In a sense its contents have also been shaped by my varied experiences of more than seven years as a foreign correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune*. In this period I have made special investigations of the political situation in such contrasting European countries as Spain, France, Albania, Roumania, and Yugoslavia.

This report, based upon two intensive months in Germany, represents the discoveries and conclusions of an independent American journalist. It is presented in the knowledge that many of the facts contained in these pages have not yet been published or have lost their full significance in condensed and disconnected newspaper paragraphs dispersed over a period of months. Even an abbreviated study of the problem of Nazi Germany's current attitude toward peace and war has been sadly lacking. Perhaps this volume may serve to point the way toward more detailed and minute examination.

In regard to this present report a few points should be made clear. First of all, these pages are based entirely upon my reportorial activities inside Germany throughout the months of September and October, 1933. I feel compelled, furthermore, to state that all the facts, incidents, and information which go to make up these chapters were ascertained and assembled on the spot, that is to say, in Germany. I have carefully refrained from using the slightest item from articles printed in the Paris, London, or other press outside the Third Reich. For equally obvious reasons I have neither sought nor accepted any information from any sources, official or otherwise, beyond the borders of National Socialism. These chapters, therefore, must be judged as a personal journalistic endeavor to make the closest possible approach to the truth regarding one single phase of National Socialist policy and activity. On that basis I am quite willing to await the verdict of other investigators and, especially, the verdict of time.

One statement of professional conviction may be added here. The American newspaper correspondent in Europe enjoys at once a happy privilege and an unusual responsibility. He is not immediately or directly concerned in the great majority of Europe's political problems. By the very nature of things a certain degree of

journalistic neutrality and objectivity ought to be within his reach. As an American foreign correspondent he has far less excuse than European journalists for taking sides swiftly or for writing to placate one set of nationalistic views or another. Nevertheless, the cultivation of objectivity and the maintenance of a middle-of-the-road attitude necessitate an eternal effort, and often a cruelly harrowing effort, in present-day Europe. It may be more than any single human being can do to succeed completely in the achievement of so tremendously difficult a task as this. I can only say that I have honestly made this effort and that, at the end, there lies a certain disillusionment from which it is impossible completely to escape. Sometimes emotions seem easier to quell than facts.

LELAND STOWE.

PARIS,
January, 1934.

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NAZI MEANS WAR

Chapter I

TWO VOICES—ONE MAN

ON October 18, four days after he had led the Third Reich out of the League of Nations and the disarmament conference, Chancellor Adolf Hitler made the following peace declaration before eight hundred of his party leaders in Berlin.

"Germany wants nothing but peace," said Chancellor Hitler. Then he added: "More than anybody else National Socialist Germany clings to peace because the National Socialist idea is based on a racial concept of state leaders united by blood. It turns toward domestic issues and therefore knows no imperialistic policy of conquest toward the outside. We reject every policy of force but we are just as much determined to guard our rights."

Four days earlier, while the Reich's Geneva bombshell was still reverberating in world capitals, Adolf Hitler spoke to foreign governments and to universal public opinion in equally

impressive language. In his personal manifesto, issued on that memorable October 14, the Nazi dictator summed up the attitude of Germany in these words: "The Government and the people reject violence as an unsuitable means to remove existing differences with the European community of states."

That same night Adolf Hitler made one of the greatest and most stirring speeches of his career. At least forty million of his compatriots listened by radio to his tempestuously earnest voice. Untold millions heard his words rebroadcast in five languages, virtually to all corners of the earth. Among other things, speaking of France, Hitler stated:

"I speak in the name of the entire German people when I solemnly declare that we all are imbued with the sincere desire to wipe out an enmity that, in regard to its sacrifices, is out of all proportion to any possible gain. . . . It would be an immense event for all humanity if these two peoples banished violence once for all from their common life. The German people is ready to do so."

These ringing phrases put fateful questions to the rest of humanity, as they put them today with disturbing insistence to the foreign correspondent within the boundaries of the Third Reich.

Is the National Socialist German government—in its actions as in its words—turned toward what makes for peace? Is the National Socialist regime ready to banish resort to violence from its doctrines and its practices? Does Nazi Germany mean eventual peace or eventual war?

After two months of closest observation and research in Germany, this correspondent is prepared to report what he has seen and learned. Until now the cyclonic pace of the Nazi revolution has stirred up a mystifying whirlwind of dust. There has been no time for correspondents in Berlin, caught up with the mad rush of front-page news every day, to sift more than a few fundamental facts from the chaff; neither to catalogue them nor to analyze what they may signify in full. Nor is it possible as yet to do this regarding all phases of Germany in the remaking. But Chancellor Hitler has challenged the world to accept the National Socialist government's expressed desire for peace. It is not my purpose simply to rechallenge the peace challenge of Adolf Hitler. It is my purpose to present those facts, based upon a personal enquiry of two months, which seem most pertinent to the all-important question posed by the Reich's Chancellor when he says, "Germany wants nothing but peace."

But before we proceed to the Germany which I have seen, one distinction has been imposed by circumstances and the record—one might almost say by Chancellor Hitler himself. For the voice of Hitler on October 14 and October 18 was not his only voice, nor was it the voice which millions of Germans know best. Adolf Hitler has two voices, and there are two tongues spoken by the National Socialist leaders of the Reich. One language has been addressed, in growing volume, for fourteen years, to the great masses of discontented German citizens. You cannot judge National Socialist Germany by one voice alone. You must listen to both and study both if you are to arrive at any approximation of the truth. What is this other Nazi voice?

It can be found in no higher an authority than in Adolf Hitler himself. In his book, *Mein Kampf* (My Battle), Hitler has poured out his entire philosophy of internal regeneration and social revolution and his most varied conceptions of what the bases of Germany's foreign policy must be. This book, in its original and unexpurgated German edition, is 781 pages in length (contrasting sharply with the some 300 pages in a recent English translation) and has been printed in more than one million copies. In the German edition of *Mein Kampf*, which graces every bookshop window in the Reich and

is being read by millions of Germans, Chancellor Hitler makes such comments as these about peace and war.

"It is necessary, then, for better or worse, to resort to war if one wishes seriously to arrive at pacifism. In reality the humanitarian and pacifist idea will perhaps be excellent on that day when the man superior to all others will have conquered and subjugated the world first of all in such a measure that he becomes the sole master of this earth. First, then, the battle, and afterward—perhaps—pacifism" (page 315).

"The question of recuperation of German power is not how can we manufacture arms. Rather it is, how can we create the *spirit* which renders a people capable of carrying arms? When this spirit dominates a people, will power finds a thousand ways, each of which leads to a weapon" (page 365).

"France is and always will be the deadly enemy of Germany" (page 699).

"To forge a well-sharpened sword is the object of a people's domestic policy; to see that the forging is done and to seek allies at arms is the object of its foreign policy" (page 689).

"An alliance which is not concluded with a view to war is absurd and worthless" (page 749).

"Not until the Germans have realized that they must engage in an active and final conflict

with France will it be possible to bring the fruitless struggle to a conclusion—on condition, however, that Germany sees in the extermination of France a means of providing her people with the necessary room for expansion. . . . There are eighty million Germans in Europe today. This policy will be recognized as the correct one when in less than one hundred years from now the continent of Europe is inhabited by 250,000,000 Germans" (page 766).

"Woe betide the National Socialist movement if (in its foreign policy) it relies on protests, instead of preparing to fight" (page 712).

Does National Socialist Germany want "nothing but peace"?

Or is National Socialist Germany "preparing to fight"?

Which voice and which doctrine is a perplexed and anxious world to accept as true and final?

Words, alas, are too obscure and too contradictory. One must go to Germany and seek for oneself. If actions are more eloquent than words, then Germany today is the most eloquent nation in Europe. Here action, and all kinds of actions, abound.

My first night in Germany I stopped at Cologne. It was only ten o'clock. I wanted to see and feel this new Germany, so I left my bags

and went to a popular café. Uniformed storm-troopers sat at many neighboring tables. Everything was orderly and gay. It was amusing, to a man from a land in which military salutes are almost never seen, to watch the extreme seriousness and energy with which every newly arrived brownshirt saluted each of his Nazi comrades in turn. They were well dressed and good-looking fellows. What matter if they bobbed up and down like puppets pulled by a string? I bought a packet of German cigarettes, choosing haphazard since I did not know the German brands. When I opened it, a colored cardboard picture fell into my hand. I would not have noticed it but for the fact that a gun barrel caught my eye. It was a picture of a steel-helmeted soldier operating a machine gun. On the back I discovered that this was one in a series of gift cigarette pictures of the Reichswehr.

I looked again at the picture with a curious sensation. The first thought that popped into my mind was this: "In seven years of residence in France you have never seen or heard of military photographs being distributed with the state-monopolized cigarettes." And then came the second thought: "But are you right or are you wrong to attach any importance to a little thing like this?" The answer to that question was carefully reserved. But in any case this

incident remains the first thing that impressed me forcibly when first I entered Germany.

On the following days of early September, impressions piled up thick and fast. I saw more uniformed men on the streets and in the public places of Berlin than I had seen in any foreign city from London to Constantinople. I witnessed more parades and marching troops in three weeks than I had seen in Paris in nine months. I heard rousing military bands at eleven o'clock in the morning, going by the office window, or on Hermann Goeringstrasse at eleven o'clock at night. I saw long columns of boys and girls in their teens, uniformed and carrying flags and marching somewhere at all sorts of unexpected hours. Often they sang and their voices were clear and high and in striking unison. I saw great swastika or imperial flags hung out everywhere; thousands of them, outdoors and indoors—always flags.

I sat down to dinner in a Potsdamerplatz restaurant. The orchestra played its quota of Nazi songs and marches, interspersed with popular airs and an occasional old German waltz. During an intermission one heard a sharp clack which echoed through the large room. It was a uniformed Hitler Jugend boy, no more than nine years of age, taking collections for the winter help relief. He went from one

table to the next. At each table he drew his fine small body erect, threw his right forearm up in a very snappy salute, and cracked his heavy leather heels together for all the world like a goose-stepper of 1914. I noticed that he went to every table with businesslike thoroughness, but that he received contributions from only five or six. On a Sunday night, going up Stresemannstrasse, I encountered a group of about thirty small boys. They too wore uniforms and marched along near the edge of the pavement led by a brown-shirted man. They were so small that I stopped and estimated their measurements at the sidewalk's edge as they passed by. The estimate was made on the basis of my own two sons who are just turning six and four respectively. The tallest of the leaders had not more than an inch or two advantage on son No. 1, aged six. The ages of these childish marchers must have ranged from nine to five. It was eight o'clock at night, and the street lights had been lit for three hours. Where had they been? Probably to a rally or to see the Nazi propaganda film, "Hitler Junger Quex," which was showing just up the street.

Such are the impressions which come bursting in upon the consciousness of a foreigner, newly arrived in Germany. What do they mean? Where do they lead one to? And whither and

to what are they leading Germany? The answers to these questions are so weighty that an honest observer hesitates to judge. He must see more, much more. He must hear more, too.

In the new Germany you will hear hundreds of speeches on the radio. You will see the radio used as a highly organized instrument of governmental policies and doctrines as it is not used in any other country on earth. But sometimes, even here where propaganda is so precious, there will be short lulls and brief gaps in the program. At such times you will hear, as I did for several weeks before I discovered its true significance, a musical little refrain which sounds as if it were tapped out on four keys of the piano. "Ping, *Ping*, ping-ping!" it goes. "Ping, *Ping*, ping-ping!" Over and over again, morning, afternoon, or evening, whenever a gap in the program occurs. At last I learned what it meant, having failed for weeks to ask the question which was in my mind. It was the refrain to one of the Nazi's martial songs. The name of the song, taken from its opening chorus, is "Volk an's Gewehr!" In other words, "People, to Arms!" Day after day for several months these four notes have been ping-pinging their repetitious refrain out of 4,521,000 registered radio receiving sets throughout the German Reich—"People, to arms! People, to arms!"

Again one asks oneself: What is the true voice of National Socialist Germany? Whatever her voice may be, this new Germany is an adventure, great and throbbing and portentous. Here are awakened millions, whether they constitute an actual majority or not. Here is a strong and vigorous tempo. Here is a new note or an old note rejuvenated.

Important as facts are, it is essential to feel the surging crescendo of the National Socialist spirit in Germany before you can be prepared to examine the physical forces which lie behind that spirit. It is necessary that the colors of the picture should not be overlooked. For that reason alone, this personal introduction. Having had this we may ask ourselves the two fundamental questions:

Is Germany rearmed—physically *or morally?*

Is Germany rearming—physically *or morally?*

The coming to power of Hitler and his maintenance in power rest solely upon the force of the National Socialist followers whom he has put into uniform. Nazi leaders deny that these hundreds of thousands of disciplined storm-troopers have anything to do with militarism or with military preparedness. To judge whether that claim is justified one must begin by knowing how the brownshirt army (S.A.), the blackcoat army (S.S.), and the Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets)

are organized; what they do and what they are trained to do. In total these three groups number approximately one million men in uniform, conservatively estimated. Hitler's spokesmen say that these one million uniforms mean nothing so far as world peace is concerned. Do the million men who wear the uniform mean nothing, too? This must be the first step toward any understanding of the temper which dominates the new Germany.

A few years ago Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, present president of the Reichsbank, made this pertinent remark in his book, *The Stabilization of the Mark:* " . . . Above all," said Dr. Schacht, "a process of moral education must be inaugurated if wars are to be avoided in the future."

It may well be that this moral education, of which Dr. Schacht spoke, offers the key to the true state of Nazi Germany's state of mind today.

Chapter II

ONE MILLION MEN IN UNIFORM

THERE are more than 1,300,000 uniformed men in Germany today—a round million men after the regular army and Prussian police have been deducted. If you estimate the adult population of the Third Reich at 50,000,000, and its masculine proportion at one half of that figure, the mathematical result is simple enough. At least 1 out of every 25 German men wears a uniform. Or to be conservative, say 1 man in uniform out of every 28.

The best way to visualize these uniforms is to tabulate them. The following figures represent the most restrained calculations, obtained from a wide range of authorities during two months of enquiries and rechecking inside Germany.

	Men
The German Reichswehr (regular army).....	100,000
The Prussian police.....	140,000
Nazi Sturmabteilung (brownshirts).....	460,000
Nazi Schutzstaffel (blackcoats).....	200,000
Steel Helmets (now entirely Nazified).....	200,000
Arbeitsdienst (the Hitler-created Labor Corps)	230,000
Grand total.....	1,330,000

These figures do not include 1,500,000 boys and girls of the Hitler Jugend, ranging in age from eighteen down to seven years, most of whom wear uniforms either regularly or occasionally. Nor do they take account of the recent strenuous recruitment of the National Socialist Party, when, from November 1 to 5, the doors were reopened into the brownshirt and blackcoat armies. Many thousands of new members joined the ranks officially at that time, as a prelude to the November 12 elections, but their exact number as yet is impossible to estimate. Probably an additional 200,000 would be a conservative figure. But eliminating new recruits and the Nazi youth movement, one million men in uniform remains a fair statement—always remembering that the official carriers of weapons are not included in this number. How is this National Socialist "army of discipline" organized? Is it militaristic? What is its relation to Germany's national defense?

To begin with we must take note of the fact that the Third Reich's leaders do not officially accept the common definition of militarism. Militarism, says Webster's Dictionary, is the "disposition to maintain strong military forces . . . the spirit and temper which exalts the military virtues and ideals."

Neither Chancellor Hitler nor General Hermann Goering nor their public-speaking associates agree with Webster. In fact, both publicly and privately, they repudiate him. In his famous Reichstag speech on May 17, 1933, Adolf Hitler declared that his S.A. and S.S. stormtroopers were no more military than "fire brigades, night watchmen, and rowing clubs." If the Reich's brownshirts and blackcoats were to be included in Geneva's discussions on disarmament, then firemen and night watchmen in other countries ought to be included too.

As a newcomer to Germany who was seeing daily more uniforms than he had seen since 1917 and 1918, I ventured to discuss this matter of interpretation with an official of the German foreign office in mid-September.

"How can you say that the S.A. and S.S. constitute a military force?" he asked me. "They carry no guns. They are totally unarmed. They wear uniforms only to inculcate in them a sense of discipline and social responsibility. The Nazi uniform becomes something sacred which they must respect. They must behave themselves, they cannot get drunk. They must be courteous and helpful at all times. Why, these men and boys are being kept in condition, that's all. They are no more militaristic than

your American football teams in the United States. It's as silly to talk about including our S.A. and S.S. in disarmament negotiations as it would be to talk of including your football teams. If anything, your American football teams are much more aggressive. They are taught to use physical force, to use strategy and to scorn injuries. I can't understand what's the matter with foreigners who get the idea that our stormtroopers have anything to do with militarism."

At the end of one and a half hours of such conversation, I began to wonder if something was the matter with myself. Hence, the decision to find out precisely what the brownshirts and blackcoats are and what they do. Do they represent only a state of domestic action in Germany? Or do they also represent a state of mind?

The brown-uniformed stormtroopers were originally organized to protect National Socialist speakers from Communist or other attacks and heckling during political rallies. As such, in the middle and late 1920's, their services were undoubtedly needed. The S.S. troops, who wear an exceedingly smart black uniform, came later on when the then-Captain Goering conceived the idea of a personal bodyguard of his own—a sort of show-window élite in the Nazi's big

parade. From these modest beginnings has grown up the greatest disciplined uniformed political force in modern Europe. Even if the brownshirt and blackcoat bodies are nothing more than a political force, the manner in which they are now organized is nevertheless of surpassing interest.

Take the S.A. stormtroopers which, at a minimum, consist of 460,000 men. It is merely necessary to remember that the S.S. body of another 200,000 are formed on exactly parallel lines, while the 200,000 members of the Steel Helmets have always existed on a military basis, being constituted of right-wing Nationalistic war veterans or sons of veterans.

The Oberst-S.A.-Leitung, or the supreme command, of the stormtroops is drawn up as follows. The combined S.A., S.S., and Stahlhelm are united under the dictatorial command of Chief of Staff Roehm, who has the scarred cheeks and nose and the hard-boiled army manners of a super-Captain Flagg. Roehm is an old army man and one of the closest intimates of Hitler. He is one of those men whose faces speak for themselves. Directly beneath Stab Chef Roehm comes the general staff, on which (with grades of commanders of army corps) are General von Epp, General Goering, August Schneidhuber, and Manfred von Killingen. Among

those next in rank, as commanders of divisions, are Prince August Wilhelm and Prince Philip of Hesse. The general staff represents a central bureau with personnel, administrative, juridical, and health sections and various others. Almost all its important posts are occupied by former imperial army or navy officers, ex-Reichswehr officers, or officers drawn from the Schupos [police].

From top to bottom Stab Chef Roehm's stormtroopers are organized along familiar military lines. The following table illustrates this clearly.

S.A. or S.S. Groups	Number of Men	Army Equivalent
Rotte	4 to 8	Squad
Schar	10 to 16	Platoon
Trupp (3 Scharen)	30 to 48	Section
Sturm	150 to 250	Company
Sturmbann	600 to 1,000	Battalion
Standarte	3,000 to 3,500	Regiment
Brigade	About 10,000	Division or Brigade
Gruppe	40,000 to 100,000	Regions
Obergruppe	Superior regions	As in Reichswehr

Under the present arrangement of the Nazi S.A. there are 7 Obergruppen, 20 Gruppen, 90 divisions or brigades, and 300 Standarten or regiments. The stormtroopers' official regulations, or Dienstordnung, which were published in October, 1932, explain the entire organization and among other things state specifically that "the Standarte corresponds to a regiment ac-

cording to the military conception." They also explain that the S.A. carry the title numbers of former German Army divisions, regiments or battalions, and they "must preserve its tradition." As a rule the stormtroopers' units today wear the same regimental numbers which previously were worn in the same localities by the old army.

Although this brief outline gives some idea of the link between the National Socialist S.A. and S.S. and Germany's official army procedure, it by no means conveys an adequate idea of the thorough military nature of these organizations as a whole. To understand this you must become familiarized with the special units of the S.A. and S.S., not to mention the Steel Helmets. Among the special units, now operating with smooth efficiency throughout Germany and under one supreme command, are the Motorstürme or motorized units, the Reiterstürme or cavalry units, the Fliegertruppe and Fliegerstürme or aviation units. There are also Nachrichtung Abteilungen (communication units), fire brigades, and marine detachments.

Before studying the details of these special units it may be well to record the regional organization of the S.A. and S.S., which closely parallels the seven regions of the standing army or Reichswehr.

Region	Headquarters	Divisions Included
I.	Koenigsberg	1, Ostland.
II.	Stettin	3, Pomerania, Hansa, and Northern Marshes.
III.	Berlin	3, Silesia, Berlin-Brandenburg, and Eastern Marshes.
IV.	Dresden	2, Saxony and Central Germany.
V.	Frankfurt-am-Main	4, Thuringia, Western Marshes, Southwest Marshes, and Hesse.
VI.	Hanover	4, North Sea, Lower Rhine, Lower Saxony, and Westphalia.
VII.	Munich	3, Highland, Bavarian East, and Nuremberg.

An eighth region or Obergruppe of the stormtroops is the Austrian region with headquarters at Linz.

But one of the most interesting and important phases of the brownshirt "domestic army" lies in its special units. Each Standarte or regiment, for example, has one motorized unit either with motorcycles or with automobiles or both. In October 80,000 Silesian brownshirts staged a mammoth rally at Breslau and passed in review before Stab Chef Roehm. There an entire motorized regiment consisting of five groups was for the first time publicly displayed. They had progressed to the point where all the cars and motor cycles were of uniform make and style. Each S.A. brigade, commanded by an Oberstaffelführer, has its own motorized unit, and so does each division, which is commanded by a Gruppenstaffelführer. In addition,

the Nazis have organized an independent Motor Transport Service which is known as the National Socialiste Kraftfahrkorps (N.S.K.K.). You may see N.S.K.K. badges worn throughout the Reich. In time of war the utility of such a completely organized transport service cannot be questioned.

Or let us examine the brownshirts' aviation units with their Fliegerstaffeln and Fliegerstürme. Virtually every S.A. brigade possesses one Fliegerstaffel or escadrille. These have been recruited by veteran war pilots, by the personnel of commercial air lines like the Lufthansa, or by glider associations. That they are conceived on military lines is attested by the fact that one of the first acts of General Goering, who—in addition to being Premier of Prussia—has made himself unofficial minister of the air, was to authorize a special aviation uniform. Under the Versailles Treaty Germany is forbidden to have a military air force. Nevertheless, Goering has given Germany uniformed aviation officers and pilots, who wear a smart gray-blue uniform and insignia of their own.

The National Socialists, perhaps in recognition of the supreme importance of an air force in the event of war, have laid tremendous stress upon aviation development in recent months. They have organized two powerful aviation

organizations, which we shall treat in detail later on. It is enough here to state that the air units of the S.A. possess sufficient planes to afford plenty of practice, whether they be privately owned machines or borrowed from commercial companies. Each Fliegersturm consists of a personnel of about seventy men. These include one chief of escadrille, six pilots, six observers, eight mechanics in two shifts, three auxiliary mechanics, electrical specialists, one chief radioman and three radio operators, and five radio installation men. As material each Fliegersturm has two or three airplanes, plus several automobiles and motor cycles. It is difficult to say how many airplanes the brownshirts possess themselves, but it is known that aviation factories have been unusually busy in Germany during the past year and that construction orders and orders for motors have been abundant.

The cavalry units are more important as an example of thoroughness and for policing purposes than in a military sense. These have not been strong, save in the border regions. At the Breslau review, however, one complete regiment of 2,000 brown-shirted riders added color to the display. The marine units of the S.A. and S.S. seem more significant. They are trained in bridge building and similar work. At Breslau some 500 brownshirts, drawn from such units,

constructed a pontoon bridge across a river within a few hours. Communication units (at least one section per S.A. regiment) specialize in wireless and telephonic liaison. Many of these special units are trained with the Reichswehr or under regular army supervision.

This, in outline, constitutes the physical backbone of the National Socialist movement. Without this physical support all observers in Berlin are agreed that Hitler's tenure of office would be most insecure, just as his arrival in the Chancellorship would have been impossible. Beyond possibility of repudiation there are more than one million men in uniform within the framework of German citizenry today. Are these million men actually armed? Are they being trained to think and act as soldiers? Are they capable of fusion with the Reichswehr? These questions occur immediately, once the organization of brownshirt and blackcoat stormtroopers has been analyzed. They are questions which necessitate a separate chapter.

But before we proceed to that it seems pertinent to seek enlightenment once more from the man whom one million uniformed men call "der Führer." In the unexpurgated edition of his book, *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler says on page 611:

"Let one give to the German nation six million bodies trained to perfection by sport, all embraced by a fanatical patriotism, animated with the most vigorous offensive spirit, and a National regime will make an army of them in less than two years, if it is necessary—or in any case, at least the foundation of that army."

The Third Reich today has 1,330,000 such bodies, trained and in uniform. It also possesses another 1,500,000 younger bodies, trained in the same school. Most of them will be ripe for entry in the S.A. or the S.S. within the next three years.

My friend in the Wilhelmstrasse insists that all that has been reported here has less to do with militarism than has an American football team.

Chapter III

STORMTROOPERS AND REICHSWEHR

IN the past three months the synchronization of 1,000,000 members of the Nazis' brownshirted S.A., the black-coated S.S. stormtroopers, and the Steel Helmets with the Reichswehr's 100,000 regular army veterans has been proceeding in Germany at accelerated tempo. Previously the stormtroopers' companies, battalions, and regiments have differed widely in numerical strength. Obviously their marching and general military efficiency can only be perfected by the establishment of numerical uniformity throughout. Their formations must be balanced and their synchronization gradually installed. This "whipping into shape" is now being done under the expert control of Stab Chef Roehm and his ex-Imperial Army corps of officers.

It has already been stated that the ninety brigades of the brownshirt and blackcoat armies have been divided into seven Obergruppen, or regions, which coincide almost exactly with the

seven regional divisions of the Reichswehr. That, however, represented only a natural preliminary step. In the days when Hitler was fighting for control of the Reich it was inevitable that platoons, companies, and regiments of the stormtroopers (Scharen, Stürme, and Standarte, if the National Socialist terms are to be used) should differ widely in numbers according to the strength of the party in various districts. In the name of organization and discipline it was essential to correct this unwieldiness and it was good sense to begin at the bottom.

As a consequence recent weeks have witnessed the redistribution of Nazi stormtroops in such a manner as to make the reorganized bodies coincide to a much greater degree with regular military formations. Brownshirt companies now average from 150 to 200 men, where previously they might number considerably less in some districts and 300 or 400 in more populated regions. Regimental strength has now been fixed at 2,500 or 3,000 men, or approximately regular army size. The stormtroopers' brigades are now being balanced up in the same manner, the brownshirt general staff's goal being the ultimate consolidation of 90 brigades or more, each having an enrollment of very close to 10,000 men. These bodies were formerly termed Untergruppen, but since September have been frankly called

brigades. Previously, too, the Untergruppen were directed by a mixture of political and military control. With their reorganization they have been placed entirely in military hands. Ninety brigades of 10,000 men each adds up to 900,000 men, not counting 200,000 Steel Helmets. Even Mussolini would not disclaim a "disciplinary force" like this. Nor is it conceivable that Chancellor Hitler will ever renounce them. There are many experienced observers in Berlin who say that Hitler rules Germany, but the S.A. and S.S. really rule Hitler.

That the brownshirt and blackcoat Nazi army and the members of the National Socialist Party have already become a privileged class in Germany is undeniable. That this privileged class threatens to become a serious problem in Germany's internal life is also undeniable. But these are points which are beyond my present scope. What is of immediate importance to the outside world is such questioning as this: Do the S.A. and S.S. receive military instruction? To what extent, if any, are they armed? Do they constitute a potential army?

Before discussing various incidents which deal with these problems directly it may be well to make certain statements which are beyond refutation. The first of these is that the one million uniformed men who make up the brown-

shirts, the blackcoats, and the Steel Helmets, are mobilizable overnight. Not only are they mobilizable but they *are* mobilized, the vast majority of them, week in and week out. Every company and platoon has been marching somewhere every Sunday for the past nine months. Most of them are under orders to attend one drill night per week. Their bodies are "trained to perfection," as Adolf Hitler envisaged them to be. They are on call to be summoned to any headquarters or designated spot at any time of the day or night. There can be no doubt that tomorrow most of them could march our American National Guard detachments off their feet in a few hours' time. As a matter of fact, when 80,000 brownshirts assembled at Breslau in October, they came there from all parts of Silesia, and most of them came on foot. Many of these companies were on the march for three days, carrying their tents and equipment on their backs.

The second point to be remembered is that every S.A. or S.S. platoon, company, or regiment has its own headquarters and that each headquarters in turn is directly under the command of and in communication with another headquarters higher up. As a result, in time of any national emergency, the speed and directness with which the Nazi "football players" can be

mobilized can scarcely be overestimated, particularly in view of their motorized units. Even if these million men in uniform did not know a rifle from a walking stick, their amazingly unified force can only be appreciated by those who have seen them march and have become familiar with the thoroughness of their organization. Having said this we may turn to other matters which bear directly on my questions.

Certain foreign diplomats in Berlin have become surfeited with taking motor excursions into the surrounding countryside because of the frequency with which they encounter Nazi stormtroopers at drill or marching home from maneuvers. Not long ago one such foreign resident stopped his car near one of those not infrequent "areas forbidden to pedestrians." He heard the rattle of explosives, and when he met the guardian of an adjoining piece of property he asked him what all the shooting was about.

"It sounds like machine-gun fire," said the foreign resident.

"That's what it is," said the guardian amiably. "Would you like to watch it? Come through here."

They went along a path, through shrubbery and a wooded patch to the edge of a clearing. Beyond stretched open countryside. Deployed in this open terrain several companies of Nazi

stormtroopers (these same troops whom Herr Hitler publicly declares to be as harmless as firemen and rowing clubs) were actively engaged in target practice with machine guns.

Such incidents as this are not at all unfamiliar to foreign residents in Germany. I had been in Berlin only a month and was walking to the American Embassy in Bendlerstrasse one day when a stern and silent motor lorry suddenly passed my way. It was midday. The lorry was uncovered. It had eight or ten rows of seats across it. There were no doors. As a result immediate descent was possible from every row of seats. In the lorry sat solid rows of black-uniformed men, perhaps fifty in all. They wore steel helmets. With both hands they grasped rifle barrels which stood erect between their knees. They looked neither to the right nor to the left. There was something inescapably ominous in the sight. Unless my eyes betrayed me, they wore the uniform of the Nazi Schutzstaffel.

In any case my eyes did not deceive me on September 15, during the impressive military parade which attended the ceremonies for the opening of the Prussian State Council under General Goering. On that day I saw several platoons of armed brownshirts and blackcoats (S.A. and S.S.) march down Unter den Linden, the first rifled stormtroopers to appear in a

public demonstration in Berlin. They bore bright and shiny rifles on their shoulders. On their heads were business-like steel helmets. They marched like veterans and they looked like veterans. There were not more than a hundred or two of them, it is true. At least, in the short time during which I watched the parade these were all I saw. Undoubtedly they were there purely as an object lesson. Nevertheless they were there, and a dozen different foreign correspondents watched them pass to the applause of the crowd.

In his peace speech to the world on October 14, Chancellor Hitler said: "There is only one body in Germany which bears arms—and that is the army."

It is common knowledge in Germany that the closest relations have been built up between the three political armies—the S.A., the S.S., and the Steel Helmets—and the Reichswehr. It is common knowledge that stormtroopers in various cities drill with regular army rifles. It is well known (and every foreign military *attaché* in Berlin has long since reported this to his government) that a very considerable proportion of the stormtroops is drilled in the manual of arms at regular intervals. It is an indisputable fact that one stormtrooper out of every three or four seen on the streets of Berlin wears a revolver

strapped to his hip in an untarnished brown holster. These are things which any seeker for information may go to Germany and see for himself, if he cares to keep his eyes open and look around a bit.

As to how many rifles of their own the Brownshirts and Blackcoats possess, that is more difficult to say. It is generally admitted that they have a sufficient number for most of them to keep adept at responding to the harsh Prussian command, "*Achtung!*" Some foreign observers estimate the number of rifles stored in various parts of the Reich at between three and four million. Virtually all are agreed that in any case there are more than enough to equip every uniformed S.A. and S.S. man. That you can not fight a war with even four million rifles is self-evident. To say that 1,200,000 men who are expert in the handling of rifles is a factor of no importance in the event of war is another matter. You must draw your own conclusion about that.

It is also of common report in Germany that companies of stormtroopers are attached by rotation for a few weeks at a stretch to the Reichswehr army. Foreign observers state flatly that these courses of instruction, merged with the regular army, go on at established intervals. They also cite the fact that Reichswehr officers are in charge of certain instruction camps for the

S.A. and S.S., such as those maintained at Doebritz and Zossen. As for machine-gun practice, this has been observed on various occasions near Medlitz and Buckow. If there exists any error about the use to which these localities are being put it will be a simple matter for the Reich authorities to suppress the "areas forbidden to pedestrians" which have been maintained there for some months past.

There is one other fact which should not be overlooked in connection with the current synchronization of the Nazi unofficial armies with the Reichswehr's regular army. This should not be interpreted in any sense as a complete merger. There has been considerable evidence of late to suggest that the Hitler government has decided to maintain the Reichswehr as a professional army. From the military viewpoint it would be a source of strength since these 100,000 men constitute an army of highly trained technicians.

The further fact exists that the officers and men of the Reichswehr themselves prefer the creation of the S.A., S.S., and Stahlhelm as parallel organizations. They do not want to lose their individuality in a much enlarged and more heterogeneous body. For this reason Hitler's abrupt departure from the Geneva disarmament conference was hailed with delight and relief by

the Reichswehr. That move opened the way for the regular army men to preserve their identity as the élite of German militarism. They are quite content to remain as the unofficial officers training corps which one day may take over virtually the entire command of a constantly growing and increasingly powerful Nazi army of stormtroopers.

After witnessing the incessant marchings and countermarchings of brownshirts and blackcoats week after week in Germany one question naturally comes to mind. Here is an unofficial army of 660,000 men at a minimum—of 900,000 either already or in the very near future. Who supports these hundreds of thousands of men, most of whom are on call at all hours? Who paid for their uniforms and who pays for their food? The Hitler spokesmen claim that a minimum of 660,000 men have been clad solely out of the funds of the National Socialist party. Some people say that a large proportion of the stormtroopers, who have no other visible means of support, receive a small petty allowance in addition to their uniforms and upkeep. It is known that, while some of them live at home, others live in barracks like regular army men. It is certain that several hundred thousand of them are kept almost constantly on the move, participating in one National Socialist demon-

stration after another, on week days as on Sundays. In such circumstances it is impossible for these men, the majority of them, to hold down regular jobs as that term is understood in most countries. It is also known that the Hitler legions never possessed clean, new and uniform-patterned regalia until after the Nazis assumed complete power last March. How much they are paid or how little and from precisely whose pocketbook the funds for their support actually comes no one in all Germany seems able to say—or is willing to say.

One question, however, is being heard among Germany's civilian population. Usually it is asked with a faint touch of irony in the voice. That question is: "Who will pay for the stormtroopers' winter overcoats?" Few people offer a definite answer to that, either. What a number of German citizens said to me was merely this: "The National Socialist government has organized a gigantic Winter Relief Campaign. We are all obliged to contribute. We have even a certain percentage deducted arbitrarily from our salaries. You have noticed, perhaps, that no committee of nationally prominent Germans of unquestioned integrity has been appointed to administer these millions of marks, collected in the name of the needy. Not even the name of a chairman of the Winter Relief fund has been announced.

Don't you think it would have been more prudent of Dr. Goebbels if he had deigned to set up some sort of a public accounting, or at least a semi-public accounting, for these 'voluntary' relief contributions?"

Whoever supports the S.A. and S.S., they are there. Whoever foots their bills their ranks have swollen astonishingly until they have become an unavoidable factor in international relations. This, at least, is one height of eminence which even an unscored-on football team has never reached. One million marching men—including the Steel Helmets—not only appear to typify discipline, as the Nazi spokesmen describe it. They seem, somehow, to a visiting Aryan of enquiring mind, to typify discipline *in excelsis*.

In his speech to the world on October 14, Chancellor Hitler said: "When the French Premier asks why the German youth is marching and falling in line, I reply it is not to demonstrate against France but to evince and give visible evidence of that political determination which was necessary for throwing down Communism and that will be necessary to hold it down."

One conclusion about the brownshirt army seems to impose itself upon any open mind. Germany is safe from Communism, today and for a good while to come; at least, by force.

But the story of the stormtroops is only one portion of Nazi Germany's big parade. The state of mind of National Socialism has extended far beyond the organization and perfecting of the S.A. and the S.S. No man can reasonably criticize the Nazi movement for lack of thoroughness. We shall next examine certain other inventions of the Hitler movement, including the Labor Corps and a new institution which is known as Geländesport.

Chapter IV

THE LABOR CORPS

THE Hitler dictatorship had scarcely clinched its grip upon the levers of power last spring when it announced plans to establish a so-called voluntary labor corps as one more measure to absorb unemployment. On May 1—the day, less than two months after the Nazis' assumption of government, when 1,000,000 men were assembled in perfect order on Tempelhof field—the Reich's Chancellor officially proclaimed the launching of a compulsory national labor service. On May 2 Dr. Robert Ley seized the free trade unions' building in Berlin, fifty labor leaders were arrested, and German labor passed under absolute control of the Nazi dictatorship. This last incident is neither here nor there in our present discussion, except as a reminder that the National Socialist regime from the beginning has had its own individual ideas about how to attack almost every problem and has never hesitated to apply them.

With customary energy and drive the Labor Corps was inaugurated and has been functioning

for many months now. At a superficial glance it resembles President Roosevelt's voluntary forestry corps and in some of its functions the analogy holds true. It has enrolled only young and jobless men (in the Arbeitsdienst they vary from eighteen to twenty-five years of age). Of necessity these bachelor workers live in barracks and are uniformed. As a matter of health and esprit de corps both the American and German labor units have a certain amount of setting-up exercises and marching drill. Young men in both units work for little more than their keep and are kept busy on public works. Here the similarities end.

The total enrollment of the National Socialist Arbeitsdienst is given as 237,000 men, scattered in 3,400 camps all over Germany. They are at work on roads, canals, and the like. They are commanded, for the most part, by ex-Army officers or Steel Helmet veterans. They have no commanders who are not active supporters of the Nazi regime. As yet this German Labor Corps is technically voluntary, for when the Reich announced its determination to make the service obligatory for a large percentage of German youth it encountered the immediate and firm resistance of the League of Nations. The step was forbidden before January 1, 1934. Now that Germany has announced its with-

drawal from the League it is generally expected in Berlin that the Arbeitsdienst will be transformed into an obligatory service at almost any time.

Why did the Geneva authorities oppose the permanent and obligatory enlargement of Chancellor Hitler's labor corps?

Without wasting space on other reasons it is evident that the political and militaristic atmosphere which dominates the Arbeitsdienst was an important factor. To avoid any possible exaggeration one can state that in many of the German labor corps' 3,400 camps the men work half a day and drill half a day. I have been told that this has been done in virtually all of them. Their uniform is the same gray-green as the Reichswehr. They are organized in companies and regiments on regular military lines. Aside from the amount of drilling to which most units are subjected this, however, is not particularly unusual.

What aroused foreign concern about the Arbeitsdienst was not its more or less matter-of-fact military framework but the attitude and actions of the men who commanded it. Soon the London *Times* and other foreign newspapers were reporting the language of ex-Army officer leaders to their labor recruits. Correspondents declared they were being Prussianized and

quoted astonishing excerpts of disciplinary rhetoric. Among the labor corps youths were some who had been Socialists, many who never sympathized with the National Socialist movement. The avowed purpose of the Arbeitsdienst commanders was to subject the youngsters to a rigid "hardening process," as much moral as physical, and to make their corps a worthy adjunct to the Reichswehr regulars and the Nazi triumvirate known as S.A., S.S., and the Steel Helmets. Military discipline was emphasized from the first and military discipline in Nazi Germany means all that the words can possibly imply.

Since the labor corps was inaugurated increasing importance has been attached to it by Nazi leaders. Orders have been issued whereby all German students are required to spend a certain period—varying from two to six months —with the Arbeitsdienst. The Reich authorities have ruled that students will only be allowed to resume or complete their college courses after they have presented certificates testifying that they have performed their quota of service with the labor corps. This is by no means because of a lack of noncollegiate jobless men in present-day Germany. The only other explanation would appear to be an official desire to have all Germany's college boys acquainted with the rudi-

ments of military drill, barracks life, and infantry terrain maneuvers. Such stress is placed upon the training and hardening of Germany's intellectuals that young German diplomats have recently been ordered to serve their terms with the Arbeitsdienst in three different camps in East Prussia.

An important portion of the activities of 237,000 young men in the labor corps comes under the heading of Geländesport. With typical German thoroughness a handbook for Geländesport, or terrain maneuvers, is on sale in practically all bookshops in the Reich. Its subtitle is: "A Help-Book for Practical Work in the Home and Country." The booklet is 130 pages in length. In its table of contents are such subtitles as "Safety on the march" and it is generously illustrated with maps and charts. Among other things these charts show how troops should be deployed, how they should approach a certain objective, and a multitude of similar instructions for land maneuvers. There is one chapter giving a complete list of commands for troops in the field. So the Geländesport manual reads, and quotations from it would be enlightening if space permitted. It is only necessary to add that there is little or nothing in the booklet about reforestation or similar sciences. The handbook

for "practical work in the home and country" is a practical handbook for infantry training.

On November 2 Bernard Rust, Prussian Minister of Education and current authority on culture in Prussia, issued a decree to the effect that future secondary school teachers and university professors must spend a training period in the Nazi's "political fighting unions" and must be drilled in Geländesport with the labor corps in "close connection" with the Nazi unions. This decree, it should be noted, was issued almost three weeks after Chancellor Hitler proclaimed National Socialist Germany's pacific intentions to the world.

What were the provisions of Dr. Rust's initiative? In effect, that when future aspirants for the pedagogical profession presented themselves for the qualifying examinations they must show certificates of training with the labor corps or Nazi "political fighting unions," otherwise they will not be accepted for positions as teachers or professors. In other words the men who hold forth in the Third Reich's universities, college, and secondary schools from now on must be well-grounded in the fundamentals of skirmishing and other infantry maneuvers. One practical result cannot be denied. If the Rust decree remains in force it will be

only a matter of three or four years before every professor and teacher in Germany can be transformed into a drill-sergeant overnight.

It should be added that the favorite manuals of not only the labor corps but also of the Nazi stormtroop regiments and divisions are the Geländesport and the Wehrsport (defense sport) Fibel [primer]. All these uniformed organizations also use the famous Soldatenfibel, which is the official military manual of the Reichswehr. So much for the training of 237,000 youths in the labor corps, a newly devised branch of uniformed service which the Hitler government has now set about to make obligatory for 90 per cent of Germany's young men. I may add that armed units of the Arbeitsdienst, equipped with rifles, have been reported as seen in various parts of the Reich; but this I report only for what it may be judged to be worth in connection with the above authentic and confirmed information.

This place will serve to record one or two associated innovations of the Hitler regime. One of the most publicized reemployment schemes launched by the National Socialists is a nationally financed program for the construction of independent motor highways throughout the Reich. These highways have been mapped out as separate arteries for heavy motorized traffic,

either paralleling ordinary roadways or cutting straight across country to connect up the chief industrial and commercial centers of Germany. In September Hitler turned the first spade for the initial section which is being built out of Munich. It is stated that these independent highways for motor traffic are intended to eliminate the competition of motor trucks and buses with the government-controlled railways, and also that the freight traffic which will move over them when completed will also be operated under Reich control. A toll system is envisaged.

Nevertheless the detailed plans of these motorized highways, which admittedly are not intended for either tourist travel or ordinary public use, reveal that they are being constructed with a keen eye to their future military utility. When they are completed, Germany will possess double arteries of road communication. This newest and second series of motorways will offer straight-through, nonstop facilities to all heavy motor traffic or to motor lorries filled with troops, or to heavy artillery and cannon, for that matter—of inestimable value at any moment of national mobilization. Berlin, Dresden, Essen, Düsseldorf, and Bremen will be equipped with swift and direct arteries of transport leading to all frontiers. Is this an accident? The reader must judge for himself.

Nor is this the only part of the motorized world which the Nazis have set out to conquer. Before Hitler-to-Goebbels-to-Goering became the byword of the Third Reich, Germany boasted of four national automobile clubs. With the Nazi talent for centralization all that has been done away with. These four automobile associations have now been merged into one—with a Nazi brownshirt official as its chief executive. According to the new Nazified regulations all German automobile owners are obliged to belong to the new unified automobile association. The result is practical in the extreme. Any motor-car owner is at the beck and call of the officials of the organization. When the Nazi party needs 10,000 cars to transport 80,000 farmers and party members to the Thanksgiving Day demonstration at Bueckeberg orders are issued to as many members of the national automobile club in so many towns and cities in the vicinity. Owners are simply told to report at a given place at a given hour; perhaps five o'clock in the morning. Each owner is expected to arrive with his gas tank well filled. If he fails to have it filled in advance, he will have to have it filled en route out of his own pocket. He is likely to drive 100 miles, wait 10 or 12 hours and drive home again, probably arriving after midnight. There are places to put good German citizens who do not

sufficiently appreciate this opportunity to serve the Vaterland—and National Socialism.

To the foreigner with an enquiring mind one speculation is inevitable. How would the Reich's new and Nazified national automobile association serve the country's welfare, for example, in the event of a declaration of war? Is there any other nation in the world whose private motorists are so efficiently organized? And are all these developments, one after another, a matter of chance?

Chapter V

THE MOBILIZATION OF INTELLECT

BUT Chancellor Hitler and his energetic remakers of Germany do not do things in a halfway fashion. It would be unfair to them and unfair to the world to judge them upon only a portion of their record of achievements, even in one limited field. In the field of philosophy their intellectual pioneers have also blazed new trails in behalf of national defense and these trails can scarcely afford to be neglected by public opinion abroad. A new word occupies the spotlight of the new National Socialist vocabulary. It is called Wehrwissenschaft—the science of national defense.

On October 6 and 7—one week before Chancellor Hitler denounced Geneva, the League of Nations, and the disarmament conference—a select group of representatives of the old Prussian military clique quietly assembled in Berlin's former War School Building for a two-day congress. The pick of the best military brains of the old Reich and the present-day Reich attended. There were representatives of the

Reichswehr and its chief of staff; high officers of the brownshirt army, the blackcoat army and the Steel Helmets. General Seldte, vigorous commander of the powerful Stahlhelm organization, was among the number, as well as numerous "retired" generals who now occupy professorships of military science in Germany's leading universities.

No announcements of this meeting were published in the German press. In fact, no report of this two-day conference ever leaked out to the Nazi-controlled newspapers and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, this constitutes the first account of it to be published abroad.

This interesting assemblage in the former War School building was the first congress of the latest National Socialist organization for military propaganda. It was formed in July under the name of "German Society for Defense Policy and Defense Science"—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaft. One of its avowed purposes is to help realize "the essential ideas of Professor Banse," that ultra-modernistic professor at Brunswick who preaches the doctrine that biological warfare (the infection of enemy civilian populations with disease germs) is the ideal weapon for disarmed nations and should enable them "to destroy their suppressors in a purely scientific way."

It can now be stated that the German Society for Defense Policy and Defense Science was laying its plans for educating German leaders and the German people at the very moment the Hitler government was preparing to leave Geneva. All that was discussed and decided at this two-day secret session in early October is probably known to a very limited number. It is possible, however, to report reliably that the conference was presided over by the president of the society, General von Cochenhausen, a former Imperial Army officer; that the goal agreed upon in the discussions was the necessity of educating the German public in all the domains of national defense; and that a series of definite tasks for the organization to pursue hereafter were adopted. Among these are the spread of military education in all technical schools, the creation of a synthetic system of military science, and educative activity on such important matters as armed force and the conduct of war.

The society's Vice President Binz, who is also military defense representative to the Reich's Ministry of Interior, gave an enlightening address upon "the formation of the military spirit." Germany, he declared, must become a nation entirely organized for its defense by means of a new military regime. The goal of the German

Society for Defense Policy and Defense Science must be "the mobilization without precedent of all the best minds and a systematic development of the living forces of national defense." German youth must be submitted to "methodical physical training to prepare it to bear arms." Above all, in all classes of the population, there must be developed the *kämpferischer Geist*—the *fighting spirit.* In the new state, Binz added, there would be no concessions to any class; even the press and all public information must be committed to this task. "The pacifist spirit must be exterminated."

Eleven days later Adolf Hitler declared, "Germany wants nothing but peace."

Just as October ended, the National Socialist regime made one concession to foreign public opinion. Professor Ewald Banse's famous book, *Wehrwissenschaft* (The Science of Military Defense) was officially banned. It had been the textbook and Bible of all professors of military science in German universities for almost a year and such—there is every reason to believe—it remains. Professor Banse's book was banned because of its startlingly frank preachings that the next war will be one of race extermination and of its coldly scientific charting of the preparative course which Germany must pursue. These statements had shocked the world.

I am well aware that Wilhelmstrasse officials will attempt to refute all the facts in this chapter on Wehrwissenschaft by the obvious expedient of declaring that Professor Banse's doctrine now means nothing because his book can no longer be bought in public German bookshops. It is true that the Reich government finally awakened to the seriously damaging publicity which Banse's book was getting abroad. The National Socialist regime took a first step on the road to good sense by banning Banse's book. But it is equally true—and of much greater significance—that Professor Banse still occupies his chair of military science at Brunswick University. He still teaches to young German collegians those doctrines of biological extermination which have been removed diplomatically from the public bookshops. Military instruction by army officer fellow-disciples of Professor Banse still goes on in scores of German universities and technical colleges. The semi-secret German Society for Defense Policy and Defense Science has not been dissolved. The inculcation of Prussianistic and Spartan virtues has been neither stopped nor abated.

Under these circumstances it is still necessary, however briefly, to discuss the creed of Professor Banse. Here are a few typical extracts from his writings.

"War is not only a factor of extermination but a principle of regeneration. It alone enables the human soul to reveal all its riches and all its force."

"Biology will stamp it (the next war) as an exterminating fight of entire nations. . . . A commission appointed by the League in 1924 for investigation of biological warfare declared that, if better developed, these means of fighting might some day be successful. Methods to be considered are infection of drinking water and other water with typhoid bacillus; also the introduction of typhoid fever through fleas and of plague through artificially infected rats. By landing in the back regions of enemy countries and discharging carriers of disease, airplanes especially should achieve *very favorable results.*"

"It is ridiculous to attempt to liberate ourselves from the chains of Versailles unless we take our destiny in our hands and unless we work at our moral preparation and at *our science of war.* For there can be no doubt for anyone, between our present misery and our future happiness, there is war. . . . That is why everyone, man, woman, and child, must know what war is."

"If the existence of a state and a people is at stake, then any means to defend themselves against a stronger enemy—and moreover, to conquer him—are right."

War, says Professor Banse, is determined first of all by moral factors while material forces are only secondary. Among his preachings are such direct proposals as these: that the conception of war must be evolved away from the idea of chivalrous combat to food blockades "and campaigns of lies destined to ruin any enemy country's prestige"; that birth rates must be accelerated to supply effectives; and that military science must seek to create "a general desire for war and victory." In cold realism these assertions can scarcely be challenged.

Who is this high priest of war? From 1906 to 1932 Ewald Banse had published volumes on the Far East, geography, and other subjects, but despite that fact had always been regarded as only a superficial scholar. He had failed repeatedly to attain recognition by being honored with a professorship in any German university. When he published his *Wehrwissenschaft*, late in 1932, the book did not at first attract much attention. But from the moment the Nazi leaders entered a Reich cabinet Banse was hailed as a great savant and in February, 1933, he was named professor of military science at Brunswick Technical College. What republican Germany had never given him the National Socialists gave him at once.

Professor Banse celebrated his fiftieth birthday on May 23. As is now the custom with all prominent Nazi leaders when their birthdays come around, the completely Nazified press sang pæans to the war-professor of Brunswick. Apropos of the fact that Banse had never obtained a professorship until Hitler came in, one Nazi party organ proudly declared, "It is simply our movement, *whose tendencies harmonized with his*, which has rendered him justice." When Banse's book was banned a few weeks ago, the *Vossische Zeitung*, in the characteristically self-revelatory manner of innumerable National Socialists, accused the Brunswick professor of having rendered a bad service to military science when he expressed tendencies "of a nature to compromise the policy of the Reich government." This is as far as condemnation of Banse has gone at home. But even this dubious repudiation was preceded by months of high acclaim in the Nazi press.

If Professor Banse's book is under a partial cloud in Germany today, his doctrine of Wehrwissenschaft is by no means in disrepute. What Banse has urged and taught with brutal frankness is being preached by scores of other military leaders of the Third Reich. It is not only being preached to the one million marching men of the

S.A., S.S., and Stahlhelm. It is being preached to the Arbeitsdienst, in scores of universities and technical colleges, and to impressionable hundreds of thousands of Hitler Jugend boys and girls. The choice of words may vary. The underlying theme is the same. The banning of no one book or set of books can change this fact. We shall have more quotations from other spokesmen in high authority later on. But we may include here the words of Banse's fellow professor, General Muff. (General Muff, incidentally, was formerly Commander of Infantry, Fifth Division, and received the first chair of military science to be created in post-war German universities—at Stuttgart, last November.)

"Military mobilization," says General Muff, "has become a total mobilization of the state, the nation, and the people. Victory will belong to him who is best prepared in all domains, including the intellectual. This necessity is imposed especially upon Germany, whom the Versailles Treaty and her financial situation prevent from taking the material measures which her security demands."

Such phrases as "best prepared in all domains, including the intellectual" have the same ring as countless paragraphs from Professor Banse. So does a speech like that of Vice President Binz of the German Society for Defense Policy and

Defense Science. So do the harangues of ex-Reichswehr and ex-Imperial Army officers to the brownshirts or the Labor Corps. There is no reason to believe that the predominant militaristic propaganda note in the Nazi movement can be any more affected by the banning of a single military treatise than a river's volume is diminished by removing a cask of water.

The propagandizing of military preparedness and efficiency is by no means confined to the intellectual field. This fact has been illustrated in the previous pages. Nevertheless the mobilization of intellect is particularly exemplified by a wide variety of seemingly independent organizations which have been set up throughout Germany, frequently under the guise of sport or physical exercise. The number of such societies is difficult to estimate and several months' investigation would be required before anything resembling a complete list could be tabulated. For brevity's sake I shall sketch in here only two, whose aspects seem particularly noteworthy. These are called the Luftsportsverband (the Air-sports Union) and the Luftschutzbund (Air Protection League).

The Deutsche Luftsportsverband was created to provide Nazi stormtroopers with aviation training and as a convenient semiindependent organization (of course unofficial) which could

serve as the framework for a restored national air force at some future date. In practice it already provides that framework and if this was not its ultimate purpose it is none the less apparent that its remarkably thorough organization lends itself to such a purpose.

The foreigner entering Germany, who speaks no German or only a smattering of the restaurant variety, is confronted by a large number of ten-syllable words which seem to mean nothing at all. Unless he has a large stock of curiosity and a persistent urge to get beneath the surface he is quite likely to leave Germany with a big proportion of these ten-syllable words still meaning nothing more than "awkward Dutch names" to him. Deutsche Luftsportsverband is such a name. The tourist will see it, or Reichsluftschutzbund, placarded everywhere; in railroad stations, in cafés and restaurants, on billboards. Great masses of military squadrons, clouding the sky! These placards are intended to make the German people air-minded—but not for travel on the Lufthansa.

Behind the words Deutsche Luftsportsverband lie a great many things of which the business man truthseeker (six days in Berlin and out again declaring the Nazi movement wonderful and German youth all pacifists) remains entirely unaware. A great deal of the widespread con-

fusion and contradictions over events inside Germany, however, has been caused and is being caused by the irresponsible statements of publicity-seeking trippers and soi-disant investigators. Expert accountants or kidney-curers, they imagine themselves transformable immediately into expert analyzers of a bafflingly complex situation in a foreign land. If you would discover how far beneath the surface such visitors to Germany have gone it is merely necessary to wax curious in specific vein regarding a body like the Arbeitsdienst or the air organizations.

Behind the Deutsche Luftsportsverband, then, lie fourteen aviation regions, carefully mapped out to cover the entire Reich. There are two air regions for each Obergruppe of the storm-troops. In each air region at least one flying school is organized. Several hundred student pilots reside in each region, already wearing the "unofficial" blue-gray uniform of the air service which is forbidden under the Versailles Treaty. From war aces and veteran commercial pilots they receive regular training in group flying and maneuvers. Some claim that they are instructed also in aerial machine-gun practice but it is difficult to say whether that has yet progressed very far. The S.A. fliers receive instruction in the Air-sports Union but they remain nevertheless under the direct command

of brownshirt officers. The military rein upon them is not slackened.

The regional groups of the Luftsportsverband are headed by former military air officers. As in everything militaristic which the Nazis have organized there is nothing at all haphazard about the machinery under which they function. In Westphalia and the Rhineland are Groups 5 and 6. These in turn are subdivided into sixteen subordinate groups, all with their separate headquarters and the inevitable link to superior bodies and the general headquarters. I have seen printed forms of the Luftsportsverband which give all the regional divisions with the addresses of the headquarters of all smaller units in cities and towns carefully listed. It is a matter for aviation experts to decide how many weeks or months would be required to galvanize such an organization into a powerful national air force.

General Goering has been the inspiring force behind the resurrection of the Reich's framework for military aviation. Today Germany's unofficial air force can boast of an official Air News Agency. As for the Luftschutzbund, equally well organized, it specializes in educating the general public in methods of self-protection against air raids and bombing. Its officials are cleaning out the cellars of Deutschland and preparing the civilian populace for the day when

they may need to plop down the stairs. Thus air-mindedness and cellar-consciousness are being sharpened in the new Germany week by week. The methodical genius of the German race is being hitched irrevocably to the motive force of Prussianization.

So, too, you may walk up Unter den Linden and pause before a window filled with "security exhibits." Here are highly-colored maps of Europe, showing the mouths of thousands of cannon gaping across the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and French frontiers toward Berlin. Or other maps picturing thousands of airplanes sweeping in from the same three directions. On these maps are such phrases as "Whose Security is menaced?" or "Who has Security in the East—in the West?" That there is much truth in the disproportionate armed conditions which these maps protest cannot be denied. It is equally true, however, that the maps do not include the regional organization of such useful bodies as the Luftsportsverband and that, psychologically, they are intended to feed a popular desire for arms, and first of all to create that desire.

Walk a little farther on the Unter den Linden and you come to the war museum. Here are samples of all the paraphernalia of the World War and here a section of front-line trench has

been recreated with stark realism and great skill. There would seem to be nothing in these scenes of mud, blood, corpses, and iron to appeal to any, save the historically curious. But Berlin's war museums, and there are more than one (my office for two months was but a few doors from one), are continually visited in spite of charged admissions. Most of those who assemble here are either National Socialists, Nazis in uniform, or young children. I know of no foreigner who has watched their faces who has not come away remarking about the strange hungry light in many adult and youthful eyes. Are the German people obsessed by a weird fascination for battle and glory? This is a question for psychologists; especially, these lighted faces in the Berlin war museums. I merely report the matter because it exists.

Psychologically Germany's leaders—which means Nazi leaders, those leaders who are vocal and have power—have turned toward war. Not merely war for liberation but war for expansion and glorification. Professor Banse has been given a slap on the wrist, it is true. But he still preaches the self-same doctrines which provoked the slap, from a governmentally installed chair of military science in Brunswick. Nor is his voice solitary. He is only one among hundreds of militarist leaders; only one among this new "primitive school" of German thinkers. Listen

to Oswald Spengler, famous author of *The Decline of the West.* In his new book (by no means banned, though it might be if the foreign press quoted it often enough), Spengler joyfully embraces all the primitive instincts and lauds Prussianism in an era when war is coming soon. The book is called *The Hour of Decision* and in it, among other things, Herr Spengler says:

"The cowardly security of the end of the last century is ended. The dangerous life, the stuff of which history is made, comes into its own once more. The time is coming—no, it is already here! —which has no place for tender souls and weakly ideals. *Primitive barbarism*, which for centuries lay hidden and fettered beneath the strict forms of culture, is breaking out once more now that culture is complete, and civilization has turned to healthy warlike joy in one own's strength, which despises the past of rationalist thought."

Yes, rationalist thought is most difficult to discover in the National Socialist creed, in the speeches of Hitler and his co-leaders. Indeed there are two voices of National Socialist Germany. But one voice is much stronger and much more prevalent, while the other voice is used for foreign ears.

And still the picture is far from complete.

What about youth? We might possibly have overlooked that but Hitlerism has not.

Chapter VI

GET THEM WHILE THEY ARE YOUNG

"INTO the brain of the smallest child should be implanted this ardent appeal: 'Almighty God, bless our arms! Be just as Thou hast ever been just. Pronounce Thy judgment and tell us if we deserve liberty. God, bless our battle!'"—Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, page 715.

When Adolf Hitler wrote these words did he mean all that they imply? Let us begin with two incidents from life in National Socialist Germany today.

The first scene occurs every morning in a schoolyard in Berlin. It is 8:30 A.M. Boys ranging from eleven to sixteen years are being given morning exercises under their instructor. But the boys are not running around or playing games. They are prone on the ground behind a heap of turned-up earth. They are throwing things. Perhaps it is a game. Their object stands some forty feet or more away. It is the dummy head and shoulders of a man. As you peer more closely through the fence you observe that they

are trying to hit, from a prone position, this dummy target. What the boys are throwing are wooden replicas of hand grenades.

The schoolboys sometimes make excellent hits. Sometimes they have difficulty in reaching the mark from that awkward position in the dirt, but they receive corrections and instructions from their teacher. After all, they are still young but some of these young muscles have improved wonderfully. After twenty minutes or half an hour of this setting-up exercise they march into the classroom to begin their other studies.

At how many schools in Germany this scene occurs daily today I do not pretend to know. I can only say that it has been witnessed daily by one foreigner whose apartment overlooks one particular Berlin schoolyard. The fourteen-year-old son of an American government employee, who was stationed until recently in Berlin, was obliged to take his daily course in hand-grenade throwing along with his German schoolboy companions. This continued until the American boy's father was happy to be transferred to another post. This incident, then, has been confirmed not from one but from several authoritative sources. Incident Number 1—it cannot be duplicated in any other European country, not even in Fascist Italy or in Russia.

Nor is it probable that our second illustration can be paralleled in any major nation, unless possibly in Japan, and Japan, after all, constitutes the contemporary spiritual brother of Nazi Germany. This second case in point concerns German youths more advanced than schoolboys in their early teens. It reveals what is waiting for young German boys when they have passed the wooden hand-grenade stage and entered college.

Herewith are a list of lecture courses culled from the 1933–1934 curriculum of the University of Berlin. These courses are all innovations since the Nazi dictatorship began to function. Naturally, an equal number of more generally cultural subjects have been dropped from the courses in order to make room for the lectures by experts which follow.

Faculty of Medicine: Courses on "Poison Gas" by Professor Behrens.

Department of History: "Military Geography and Military Policy," by Dr. von Niedermayer.

"Strategy and the Art of War in Antiquity," by Professor Weber.

Department of Science: "Military Technique and Its Relation to Mathematics and Physics," by General Karl Becker.

"Military Utilization of Electrical Means of Transmission," by Professor Kiebitz.

From the curriculum of the Gymnastic Institute: Course of lectures on "Maintenance and the Perfecting of the Military Aptitude of the Individual and of the People," by Professor Johannes Mueller.

From the curriculum of the Institute of Chemistry: Courses on "Combat Gas" by three professors, including Dr. Baumgarten and Dr. Thilo.

From the winter schedule of the Lessing Hochschule: Four lectures by Major von Arnim on the military significance of four important battles of history, including Waterloo.

This list offers merely an indication of the type of courses which are being given today in a score (or perhaps several scores) of the most important universities and technical colleges throughout all Germany. In most of these universities and technical colleges, if not in all of them, the military science courses are required subjects. In many of them the courses on poison gas include instruction in the filling of gas bombs and in all aspects of chemical warfare. In most of these colleges, too, students are obliged to devote one day per week either to the study of war science in some of its various phases or to infantry drill.

In what type of schools is this intellectual preparation for war going on?

We have already stated that General Muff was granted the first chair of military science at the Technical College of Stuttgart in November, 1932. In January, 1933, the *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger* announced the creation of a military science department at the University of Marburg. The Nazis were already within reach of complete power. Slightly earlier the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* had announced the appointments of General von Cochenhausen and General Haushofer to professorships for the newly created military science chairs at the University of Leipzig. On May 26 the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the Nazi's official organ, announced the capture of that venerable seat of German learning, the University of Heidelberg. Major Schnitthener, a retired army officer, became a professor there. At the Superior School of Political Sciences in Berlin, General Kaupitsch (retired), former commander of Artillery, 5th Division, had been installed in charge of the college's newly conceived Military Policy Division. At the University of Koenigsberg, General Hænick was lecturing on "The Introduction to Questions of Military Defense and the Future War." At the Superior Technical College of Berlin, General Becker was in charge of Military Science. Major von Arnim's appointment to another

Berlin college, in charge of military instruction, had been announced as early as last May.

So reads the list of Prussianism's complete conquest of Germany's universities and in reality it is very much longer than the excerpts cited here. "Intellectual preparation for war" has been adopted as the slogan of the entire Banse-Wehrwissenschaft school of military thought and in equal measure by the leaders of the National Socialist Party whose Führer has been offering peace to the world, verbally, ever since October 14.

It should be noted at this point that this wholesale installation of military experts, generals, and war science into German schools has been done in open violation of Article 177 of the Versailles Treaty. This article specifically stipulates that all German "establishments of learning, universities . . . associations of any nature, whatever may be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military question. Notably it shall be forbidden to them to instruct or exercise, or to permit to be instructed or exercised, their members in the profession of the use of weapons of war." There seems to be no doubt that by installing chairs of military science in Germany's universities the Third Reich's government has opened the door

for active intervention by the League of Nations, whenever one of several powers decides to lodge its complaint. It is possible that that day may be not far removed. When that day comes, will the National Socialists dissolve the immense machinery for intellectual preparations for war which they have constructed so rapidly and intensively? Or will they refuse?

But these two instances show only the surface of the Prussianistic Nazi "youth policy"; the main attack of this youth policy is directed against boys and girls, even more than the young men in the universities. It begins with the immediate application of Chancellor Hitler's version of a proper prayer for children when they begin to speak. Or we may take the words of Reichsminister of the Interior Frick, one of Hitler's closest lieutenants.

On May 9 (the Nazi government had been in power only two months) Reichsminister Frick announced a new law for the German schools. In customary National Socialist fashion he explained the basic principles of this law at great length and, in this case, with clarity. "The military idea," said Frick with gratifying frankness, "must find ample treatment in school instruction. The German people must learn once more to see in military service the highest patriotic duty and source of honor; the germ of

the military idea must be planted in the youth now growing up."

Reichsminister Frick's understandable desires are receiving full attention. "The germ of the military idea" is being planted with organized fervor in the German boys and girls who are now growing up. How is this being done? What effect is it having?

We have already seen that all university and college men are now being given both military drilling and military science. We have read those decrees which oblige every university student and all professors and teachers to spend a certain period of training with the Labor Corps or other military units. Efficiency dictates that you must first train the schoolmaster, then train the student. Many schoolmasters, however, have already been trained and pacifists or protesters lose their jobs. It is probable that several thousand of them have already lost their jobs.

After the schoolmasters comes the Hitler Jugend, the youngest Nazi party organization, and that, too, in brown uniforms—at least for parade occasions. The total enrollment of the Hitler Jugend is estimated today as at least 1,500,000 boys and girls. They range in age from seven to eighteen years. When the boys reach eighteen they are automatically absorbed in the stormtroops, S.A. or S.S.—those fine-uniformed

bodies of men whom they have been taught to idolize as possessing all the Germanic and super-Nordic virtues. The ranks of the brownshirts will swell swiftly indeed in the next three years, if the record of the past two years is any criterion.

I have been told that there is not a school in Germany which does not have its Hitler Jugend organization. This may be a slight overstatement, but it is true that even some of the most select and restricted private schools in the Reich now have rabidly Nazi boyish groups. Understandably so since their teachers and headmasters openly encourage it. Understandably, too, because the Hitler Jugend boys outlaw those classmates who are too sissified or too lacking in patriotism to join up. The great mass of school children are drawn or forced into the Hitler Jugend from the moment they reach seven years of age. As another contributing factor one of the first acts of the Hitler government was to ban all youth organizations, including the Boy Scouts. This was done on June 23. There had existed hitherto Socialist boys' outdoor clubs and many of these boys' organizations owned their own huts—to which they hiked for outings. The Nazi dictators seized all these pieces of boyish property and turned them over to the Hitler Jugend. Socialist boys could join up or stay at home.

GET THEM WHILE YOUNG

In the vast majority of German schools today, one might almost say in all of them, the children do a great deal of marching. They march in and march out; often they march at recess time; often they are marched for blocks through the city or town before they are allowed to disband. Soon they get to a point where they had rather march anyway. They sing patriotic songs and give salutes. A child feels grown up and important doing things like that. The Hitler Jugend have many marching songs; excellent, martial tunes. They now have the theme song of the great child's propaganda film, "Hitler Junger Quex." You must hear shrill childish voices singing a song like this to appreciate what the Nazi movement is doing to the spirit of German youth:

> Unsere Fahne ist die neue Zeit,
> Und die Fahne führt uns in die Ewigkeit.
> Ja, die Fahne ist mehr als der Tod.
> (Our flag is the new Era
> And the flag leads us to Eternity.
> Yes, the flag is more than death.)

Thousands of very young voices singing day after day—no, shouting it: "Yes, the flag is more than death."

Reichsminister Frick says, "The germ of the military idea must be planted in the youth now growing up."

There are numerous ways of planting that germ. On October 31, for instance, several hundreds of Hitler Jugend were assembled in a Westphalian town for the unveiling of a monument to an archangel; in fact, to the most appropriate archangel that these molders of youth could have chosen—a monument to the archangel Michael himself. A Hitler Jugend leader (and all Hitler Jugend leaders are active and trusted members of the Nazi party) addressed these young boys in their teens in the following fashion:

"The ancient march order, which is protected by our fallen heroes, reads 'In the decision for bloody sacrificing.' This archangel is leading the front of comrades and this front is formed by the warriors of the Reich who have only one enemy—the opponent of the Reich and its rulership.

"We do not want to speak the warm words of peace here. Our words are dictated *by the terrible appeal of war.* Young crew, raise the hand of oath before the monument which is dedicated to *the sublimity of bloodshedding.*"

Hundreds of young hands went skyward, fingers straight and firm.

It is a very difficult thing for the fairest minded man in the world to speak the same language in National Socialist Germany today.

In regard to such incidents as the above (and such a speech is by no means an isolated event) and in regard to the general militarization of the Hitler Jugend, in school and out, it must be pointed out that there exists a certain thoughtful minority in the Nazi party which remains strongly opposed to these policies. Thus far this minority, whose size is difficult to estimate, has exercised little or no restraining influence. Naturally enough, it is virtually impossible for them to do so when Reich cabinet ministers are committed to concentrating upon "the germ of the military idea." Now, with twelve-year-old boys drilling their junior classmates of eight and ten in schoolyards throughout the land, and when Hitler Jugend boys are observable in Berlin parks playing with wooden cannon, the achievement of a change in thought and action is all the more difficult.

One of these boys was asked recently what he would do if war occurred. "We don't want war, of course," he said. "But if we are ordered to go, why we'll have to go."

"Right or wrong?" asked the foreign journalist.

"Of course," was the reply. "An order is an order!"

The German character is not suited for conscientious objectors. Some Hitler Jugend boys, too, have taken to beating up classmates who do

not join. You cannot preach force to youngsters without being taken at your word. Germany's youth are millions strong. They are being channeled systematically, thoroughly, and passionately in one direction. That direction is not the one which Adolf Hitler seemed to indicate when he said, "Germany wants nothing but peace." Can any nation's rulers teach war and get peace?

Nor are the National Socialists' organized preachings exhausted with the doctrinal hunks of raw meat which they are feeding to the entire German youth. There are teachings about Pan-Germanism, about Germany's future place in the sun (and on the solid brown earth) and about the German nation's necessity of expansion.

Chapter VII

THE GOSPEL OF GLORIFIED GROWTH

IN the six preceding chapters I have submitted a fairly detailed report on the moral and muscular rearmament of the German people under the aggressive impetus of National Socialist plans and National Socialist commands. The entire scheme of this moral rearmament is amazingly varied and inclusive. In its psychological aspects the Nazi rearmament program (they call it the science of military defense) has been seen to be most significant of all.

Yet in all these phases my report has been limited by time and space. Only those most obvious and most easily confirmable mosaics have been fitted into the picture. The exploration of numerous interesting sidelines has been abandoned of necessity. If the Carnegie Peace Foundation wants to render a genuine service to universal knowledge of the new Germany it should supply an objective, dispassionate, and unimpeachable scholar or investigator with a year's funds and send him, unknown and unheralded, into the Third Reich. Better yet, it

should send three men with different backgrounds and contrasting training, all having keen interrogatory minds, and compare their reports. These present chapters simply constitute a preliminary attempt to assemble within one frame some of the most striking and important characteristics of a momentous picture. Until now I believe such a report, based upon the positive results of Nazi leadership since March 5, 1933, has not been published, even in this present insufficient degree.

It would be a serious error to dissociate Nazi actions from the Nazi state of mind. It would be an equally grave mistake to fail to grasp and fail to examine the link between present steps in the moral rearmament of Germany and those National Socialist broad and fundamental policies which point directly toward the governing motives of a future war.

But perhaps the gravest error of all would be to assume that 1,300,000 marching men in uniform and the studied implanting of the "military germ" in the youth of the entire German nation are directed only toward the ultimate rupture of the chains of Versailles. One must study the details of National Socialist foreign policy and one need only do that to discover that Hitlerism demands and intends to procure ultimately much more than mere liberation from the Versailles

strait-jacket. There exist a Nazi gospel of expansion and a Pan-Germanic creed. This gospel and this creed are not new. They have been preached incessantly by Hitler and his original coterie of followers for fourteen years. Since 1930, when the Rhineland was evacuated and the last French soldier withdrawn, the host of German citizens who have embraced the National Socialist program has increased dramatically by millions upon millions. These new converts have wildly applauded every utterance of Nazi leaders referring to Pan-Germania and the creation of a united nation of 80,000,000 Germanic people. They have cheered, no less vigorously, the repeated mention of final expansion in the east. Chancellor Hitler has revivified the Drang nach Osten and claimed it for his own. What he preaches is not only a liberated Germany but the creation of a new and greater Germanic Empire, stretching from Vienna through the Balkans to Constantinople and toward the road to Baghdad; stretching directly eastward through Poland and into the Ukraine. If there lingers any doubt about this one need but read the unexpurgated German edition of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, always remembering that the Chancellor of the Reich has never publicly repudiated any statement which is contained in his personal political philosophy.

"It is necessary," writes Hitler on page 731, "that, without regard for traditions or prejudices, it (the National Socialist movement) have the courage to assemble all the forces of our people to progress in the path which will take it out of the narrow space in which it has to live today and will lead it toward new territories."

"The settling of accounts with France would be useless if it were made the sole objective of our foreign policy. It can only begin to mean anything when it is regarded *as covering our rear* for an expansion of territory in Europe" (page 741).

"Let one but have the necessary sudden initiative to come to an active and final explanation with France and launch one decisive battle including the most extensive objectives on the German side; it is only then that one will be able to put to an end the eternal and in itself unfruitful fight between ourselves and France. That, it is true, on condition that Germany sees only in the destruction of France a veritable means permitting us to give our people, as a result and finally, another place of possible expansion" (page 766).

"So in the future it is not by the grace of nationality that we shall gain the land which is the life blood of our people, but by the might of a victorious sword" (page 741).

Phrases like these, referring always to Germany procuring new, large, and undefined stretches of land, are astonishingly repetitious in Hitler's book. But one need not rely upon the Führer alone. It would be possible to quote lengthily from the writings and speeches of scores of National Socialist leaders. I shall content myself here with only two.

At the opening of the Prussian Diet, Wilhelm Kube, Nazi floor leader, declared: "I, as a Prussian, say that we Prussians are Pan-Germans; that we shall continue to be so, and that we shall have obtained our goal only when all Germany, including German Austria, is united with our Vaterland in one great state which can then serve Germany's mission in the world."

There is small comfort in an open and frank statement like this either for all of Austria or for large slices of debatable population in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Nor is there any promise of peace. If you do not know what is in the minds of the National Socialist dictators it is only because you have not listened to their speeches with sufficient attention or read their writings with sufficient care.

Turn also to numerous declarations by Alfred Rosenberg, chief of the foreign political department of the Nazi party and a man once prominently mentioned for German Foreign Minister,

an office which it is not yet impossible for him to achieve. Among other things Rosenberg says: "The first stage"—and this, be it remarked, is labeled as merely the *first*—"of the great German revolution will only be finished when National Socialism has become the foundation thought of 80,000,000 Germans."

The world, then, has been told precisely what the Third Reich means by its incessantly repeated phrase territorial expansion. It means, first of all, a united German-Austrian empire with large slices of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Central Europe included. After that it means the dominance of Prussian culture over all of Europe and the Drang nach Osten. It is to be achieved, in Herr Hitler's own words, "by a strong and smiting sword." Only when these fundamental facts of Nazi foreign policy have been clearly catalogued in the mind can the full significance of the Nazi's unprecedentedly thorough program for the moral and physical rearmament of Germany be understood.

Nor is the great mass of German civilians allowed to forget these fundamental motive forces, these *raisons d'être* of the Prussianistic and Nazi-driven militarization of the Third Reich. Millions of Germans are reading numerous books by Nazi leaders which clearly set forth the expansionist goal and realistically accept

war as an inevitable means to a glorious end. The propaganda genius of the world's greatest propagandist cannot be expected to neglect this important field of preparation. The inflamed and honest patriotism of a great and lusty-bodied youth cannot be expected to analyze either the dangers or the ultimate meaning of the doctrines which are dinned into their ears week after week. When Edgar Mowrer said "Germany Sets the Clock Back" he exaggerated nothing. The Germany of today, as far as the policies and actions of those who hold it in merciless control are concerned, is the Germany of 1912 and 1913 —only more so.

You may sit down in a café or restaurant in almost any German city of any size whatever. Eventually your eyes will be caught by a large placard placed on the wall in advantageous position. It is a large map of Africa and four bright red spots stand out upon it. Above the map are two flags, the Imperial German banner and the Nazi emblem—the swastika in the foreground indicating clearly the source of the entire conception. You walk over to look more closely. The four red spots which grip the eyes from the other side of the room are named Togoland, Cameroon, German East Africa, and German Southwest Africa—the Reich's lost African colonies, torn from her by Versailles. In German

underneath you read the following sentence: "Here also lies the space for our existence."

That this feeling is perfectly natural, who can deny? That it is backed by very considerable justification, who in England or America today would attempt to refute? That it is not placed in thousands upon thousands of cafés and public places to ferment discontent and a final reckoning, who would be naive enough to contend? It is the inevitable and tragic mixture of right and wrong in all things pertaining to the post-war map of Europe. But what is most important of all is the fact that it lends an understandable and justifiable support to a dynamic and aggressive campaign for Pan-Germania and the fertile spaces of the east.

"Here also lies our space for existence."

This, too, is a vital argument in the National Socialist foreign program. They say that 65,000,000 German people have been deprived of sufficient space in which to live and breathe. These millions of people cannot continue to exist as they are. There simply is not sufficient room, and it may be that they are right. Who knows?

But while Nazi leaders preach space-strangulation, they also preach a doctrine of growth of population, which Chancellor Hitler has defined with perfect frankness when he wrote that in less than 100 years Europe would be populated,

not by 80,000,000 German-speaking people, but by 250,000,000 Germans. If sixty-five or eighty million Germans possess so little space today that they are all living in misery or severe straits, where and how—one wonders—will 250,000,000 Germans live? Where will this vast horde of new Germans come from?

The answer lies, according to the firm policies of the National Socialist government, in a deliberate and scientific increase of the birth rate. As in Italy, propaganda to this end constantly appears in the Nazi-controlled press. In June, Reichsminister Frick publicly deplored the "menacing decrease" of the German birth rate to a point where he said the average family was spawning but one or two children. Frick also issued a decree whereby loans of 1,000 marks ($250 at par) will hereafter be granted by the state to all newlyweds. The funds for this will be supplied by new and much heavier taxes on all bachelors and spinsters. The Nazis are also refusing to give women jobs or to reemploy women who lose their jobs. In Germany's present economic plight this will inevitably tend to increase prostitution but it will also increase marriage and motherhood, at least to some extent.

With such methods as these National Socialist Germany demands new and enlarged territories

and has set about the systematic creation of a constantly increasing living force of internal combustion. Great racial populations follow instinctive laws. They expand or they annihilate themselves while struggling to expand. Will they annihilate European civilization in the process? That does not appear to be the concern of Adolf Hitler and his associates who have launched energetically upon the triple policy of propagation, militarization, and territorial expansion. No empire was ever built by a pussyfoot. And Nazi Germany is no place for men or women with weak stomachs or small appetites.

The next question can scarcely be sidestepped.

Can National Socialist Germany make war today, or even this year? How strong and important are her present military armaments? How long a time would it require for her to be in a position which would enable Herr Hitler to put his openly announced foreign policies, based on force and nothing less than force, into effect?

Chapter VIII

THE PROSPECTS FOR A GERMAN-INSPIRED WAR

AT the outset two statements should be made.

In these recent critical weeks, neither inside nor outside of Germany have I encountered a single responsible diplomat, foreign correspondent, or experienced international observer who believes it possible for the Third Reich to start an aggressive war within the next few weeks or months.

In this same period I have not encountered a single experienced diplomat, journalist, or expert in foreign affairs—cognizant with conditions inside Germany—who did not believe that the present National Socialist offensive for moral and material militarization of the entire German people could result except in eventual war. Some say that the only consequence of the unchecked continuance of the Nazi policies and actions, which I have outlined here, will be another European war in about two years'

time. Others say, surely within five years. Not one has ventured to deny that another European catastrophe lies directly ahead—unless in some way Europe can steer round it.

It is not the purpose of these paragraphs to reopen the old question of apportioning the blame, for which virtually every major power could well accept a portion. Nor is it a reporter's immediate task to conjecture here upon possible means of escape, although such means as once existed have dwindled perceptibly and are now beset by unpredictable hazards. My immediate task is to go on describing, with an urgency forced on me by the facts, how the probability of an eventual war in Europe has been heightened by two developments: by the Nazi challenge for equal rights and freedom from Versailles and, even more, by the swift and organized Hitlerite forging of new weapons with which Germany could finally grasp this goal and others more vast, whether Europe likes it or not.

Now for the specific question: Can Nazi Germany make war today?

First of all, it is perfectly clear that neither Adolf Hitler nor General von Blomberg, chief of the Reichswehr, nor Stab Chef Roehm, chief of the Nazis' unofficial army of one million marching men, wants a war of any kind within the next two years (at a minimum) if they can possibly

avoid it. The Third Reich is not strong enough. The spirit of Germany's young men and boys has not yet become sufficiently hardened. Germany is still altogether too weak in heavy artillery, big tanks, and aircraft. There are plenty of good reasons for Adolf Hitler to say "Germany wants nothing but peace!" even while the militarization of the thought and actions of an entire great people proceeds as it never has proceeded in modern times. Mr. Robert Dell, distinguished veteran correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, was in Germany during the months that I was there. He has been a fearless critic of many French policies and was once expelled from France. Nevertheless he says today: "We fought the last war to end war. What Hitler-Germany now wants is a peace to end peace." Whether you may agree entirely with Mr. Dell's diagnosis or not, it is none the less true that a few more years of peace would fit in admirably with the National Socialists' Prussianization program as it has been outlined in these pages.

But we still want to know just how physically strong, in armaments, the Third Reich is today. And that, of course, we don't know. It is doubtful whether any layman can answer this question in more than a fragmentary manner. A few indications can be given, some of them of considerable essential importance, but little more.

Not even the anxious and fearsome French claim that present-day Germany has many big guns or tanks hidden away. It is generally agreed that, although the Reich has already violated a considerable number of the provisions and restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, she has not built large-calibered cannon or huge tanks in any great number. But some of Germany's disturbed neighbors take no comfort from this assumption. They point out that when Germany does begin to manufacture in earnest she will possess only the latest and the most highly perfected models and that none of her guns or tanks will be out of date. It is claimed, too, that since the Germans were unable to construct heavy weapons in large numbers they have been able to concentrate upon perfecting plans for the most effective models of heavy artillery, tanks, etc., which they will want later on. Perhaps, on paper, and in single test models, their weapons are much the best. Who can tell?

There are certain facts, however, which are likely to escape the average citizen. The first of these is that almost every German armament concern owns subsidiary companies abroad. It has been possible, therefore, for German experts to experiment widely in the manufacture of all kinds of "type" weapons outside Germany. Most foreign observers in Berlin express no doubt

that this has been done. Under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty it would be the perfectly human course of action.

As a matter of record, the names of a few of the important German armament plants, with the locations of their foreign subsidiary companies, are given here.

Rhein-Metal, which manufactures all kinds of weapons, has a subsidiary—Waffen-Fabrik Solothurn—in Switzerland.

Minimax Gesellschaft (smoke apparatus of all kinds) owns a plant in Amsterdam.

Junkers Aviation company has a branch in Sweden.

Auer Gesellschaft, specialists in gas masks, also owned a Swedish branch, at least until recently.

It is freely charged in Berlin that test plans and type weapons have been regularly experimented with by such firms as these inside or outside Germany for a number of years past. How important the results have been, or just what the results were, are probably known only to high officials of the Reich and in greater or lesser degree to the secret services of a few great powers.

It must be recorded, too, that certain German factories were permitted to continue a certain limited amount of armaments manufacture under the Versailles Treaty. The Polter firm was authorized to make cartridges and cannons of

77 caliber. Bochumer Verein in Westphalia continued to make shells under certain restrictions. Rhein-Metal at Düsseldorf remained a manufacturer of artillery, as did the great Krupp plant. In addition to these the Armaments Office (Waffenamt) and the technical laboratories of the Reichswehr remained and are more busy now than at any period since the treaty was signed. These few highlights offer some idea of the industrialized armaments potentialities which remain within the Reich or within its control.

A few developments, which may or may not be straws in the wind, can be learned by a journalistic observer in Germany today. The powerful Bochumer Verein has recently enlarged its equipment and is busier than it has been for a long time. Since January of last year Rhein-Metal at Düsseldorf has taken on about 1,000 more workmen, whether for an increased output of cannons and gun parts or merely in connection with the government's reemployment decrees few people know.

What is charged by some experts who have been watching the activities of armament plants in Germany is that a method has been devised which necessitates broadening the basic equipment of the large German factories. Large orders have been given spasmodically, it is said, with a very short time limit for delivery. In order to

meet these terms the armament makers have been compelled at various times to increase their machinery and plant equipment. Even in such cases the immediate result has been of less importance than the long-run potentiality. What worries the Foreign Offices of Germany's neighbors is the conviction, apparently based upon sound information, that the groundwork and structural foundations of German armament plants have been strategically enlarged and that the necessary machinery for the manufacture of heavy artillery and other heavy arms, now forbidden, apparently stands installed. Whether rightly or wrongly there appears to be a surprising unanimity among foreign observers, who ought to know, to the effect that Germany is equipped to turn out an astonishing amount of that heavy armament, which would be so vital to her in the event of a conflict, within little more than a year at most. This conviction is so strong that the intimations behind it can scarcely be entirely ignored by anyone who attempts to reach some estimate of Germany's potential military force today.

I found no qualified foreigner in Berlin who entertained the slightest doubt about larger amounts of smaller weapons being secretly stored inside Germany. It is admitted that the Reich possesses plenty of smaller cannon. It is

stated by men who should know that the entire one million men of the S.A., S.S. and Steel Helmets could be supplied with rifles tomorrow, although such a number exceeds by far the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. I have heard estimates of Germany's rifle supply as 3,000,000 or 4,000,000, but such figures may be an injustice. It is impossible to say. It is possible to state with confidence, however, that companies of the Nazi political armies are seen carrying arms every now and then and that these detachments handle them like veterans. It is also possible to state that certain sections of the Brownshirts and Blackcoats receive outdoor target practice with machine guns and that the number of modern machine guns inside the Reich runs into many thousands, though their exact total cannot be ascertained.

One stumbles, however, upon isolated incidents, such as the fact that a barrier has been built recently about one section of the Krupp plant and that this section is guarded with the greatest secrecy. Or such as the further fact that, whereas a year ago the German airplane factories were open to the visits of qualified foreign specialists, certain parts of numerous aviation plants today are kept shut off from all foreign eyes. Or such as the further fact that the German government recently bought the rights to one of the

fastest and best American military air motors and are now installing the necessary equipment to enable them to be able to turn out several hundred fighting planes per month.

It is well known that the Germans have not possessed an air engine, suited for military purposes, which could faintly compete with those now in use in at least two important foreign countries. These two powers are the United States and Great Britain. It was natural for the Reich to seek to improve the standard of airplane motors which one day may be needed uniquely for military purposes. Germany has such an engine now, foreign-made though it may be, and I am informed that she will be in a position to manufacture it within five months. High-powered airplane motors, of course, are easy to store. The important thing is to have the proper machinery and equipment to permit their manufacture at a rapid and efficient pace.

What emerges from my question is that we must leave the precise details of Germany's material armaments strength, as of today or maybe tomorrow, to the specialists and the secret services of an unhappy Europe. And important as these things are they dwindle to minor significance beside the inescapable perturbations which are inevitably excited by the present National

Socialist state of mind. Militarism, after all, is mental first and only becomes material and physical as a result of the "spirit and temper which exalts the military virtues and ideas." Even the German dictionaries agree about this.. One of them defines militarism as the "predominance and preference given to soldiership and the sword-law." There is plenty of such predominance and preference to be found in Nazi Germany today.

But perhaps we can resort to no better authority than Chancellor Hitler himself for an exposition of the ultimate significance of the Nazi state of mind. On page 714 of *Mein Kampf* Hitler says:

"By genially exploiting these sadistic cruelties by propaganda, how one can shake the indifference of a people, carry it to indignation and make that indignation explode! . . . To the point where finally the common sentiment of subjected shame and common hatred in sixty millions of men and women will become an ardent sea in whose breakers surges an iron will and which lets loose this cry: *We want arms once more!* For that, it is true, it is necessary that—from the child's A.B.C. books to the last newspaper, all the theaters and all the cinemas, all the columns of advertising placards and all available palisades —should be placed at the service of this great mission."

Does this "great mission," so warmly sponsored by Herr Hitler, bear any faint resemblance to the perpetuation of European peace?

And even if Herr Hitler, by any chance, really means only a small part of what he has said, can this doctrine be reconciled either with Hitler's offers of peace or with the militarization of the German youth and the German people which is being systematically achieved under Nazi leadership?

It has been my intention to emphasize throughout this report the direct responsibility of National Socialism and the Prussianistic school. The Nazi dictatorship reigns supreme and in unchallengeable control, but it would be unjust to conceive of this dictatorship and its government as representing the whole German people. There exists a National Socialist dictatorship and there exist 65,000,000 German people, probably not much more than 50 per cent of whom today are National Socialists at heart. What is the relation of the concept of force behind the Nazi dictatorship to the German people themselves? And can the world be sure that Hitler and his leaders will know when to use force, and, of greater importance, how to refrain from resort to force?

Chapter IX

CAN THE GERMAN PEOPLE RESIST A CONCEPT OF FORCE?

NAZI Germany is dominated by emotionalism and force.

The entire program of the Hitler movement has been to destroy first; then to rebuild from the ruins. So the Third Reich destroyed the Weimar Constitution and the German Republic, utterly and completely, within a few weeks. So the Nazi dictatorship destroyed one political opponent after another, from Communists to Catholics, from Centrists to Nationalists. So, too, the Nazis destroyed the independent and nonpolitical German Protestant Church. So, on October 14, Adolf Hitler smashed completely the separate parliamentary systems of seventeen German states with the same impulsive gesture with which he impugned Geneva. In precisely the same fashion the Führer and his henchmen intend to smash the Versailles system, and there exists no sane reason for failing to believe that ultimately they will do so.

Almost every democratic institution and individual right that Hitlerism has obliterated to date vanished as part of a fixed and unalterable program. For months and years in advance Nazi spokesmen had promised each one in this audacious series of forceful destruction. National Socialism deserves much more credit for its astonishing frankness regarding its intentions than it has yet received. And when it starts to rebuild or to expand, National Socialism adheres with equally ruthless fidelity to its promises.

It would be nothing short of folly, therefore, to take Hitlerism at anything less than its own words and deeds in regard to moral and physical rearmament. That the Nazis themselves term this moral and physical rearmament in much more innocuous language; that they refer always to the Science of Military Defense, with emphasis always on national defense, alters in no degree the fundamental facts behind the terminology. Emotionalism and force must be recognized as dominant factors in Nazi Germany's remilitarization, as in everything else.

Why, then, should the world believe that Chancellor Hitler will be satisfied with anything less than he demands, in his public speeches and in his amazingly outspoken book *Mein Kampf?*

How is one to expect a dictatorial regime, which has destroyed every vestige of a meek

republic, which preaches force and lives by force, to exercise an unprecedented and utterly contradictory restraint in its conduct of foreign affairs and in the achievement of its external program?

These are questions which every thoughtful student of present-day Nazi Germany is compelled to ask himself. You may also ask: What about the German people? And that is important.

In these preceding chapters I have endeavored to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the National Socialist movement (with its strongly supporting Prussian clique) and the German people as a whole. It has been my principal desire to report facts with as great a degree of objectivity as possible. Nor can anything be gained by a wholesale indictment of an entire nation when some fifteen million voters of that nation have been rendered impotent and incapable of expressing their desires. It is also my conviction that in no land, which is throttled by a dictatorship, should a correspondent permit himself to fall quickly into the habit of using the terms "government" and "the people" as synonymous. Even a yes-vote of 40,000,000 in the elections of November 12—especially in regard to the single Nazified election list—was recorded at the price of terrorism still but partially appreciated outside of Germany. That

vote still fails to prove that Hitler has won more than from 45 to possibly 60 per cent of Germany's population, although unquestionably he is likely to have 75 per cent converted within another year. The November election returns, however, do tend to prove—as everything associated with the successive events of the Nazi revolution has tended to prove—that German citizens are excessively malleable.

I went to Germany with one desire uppermost in my mind; to try to reserve judgment as long as possible and to try to be fair. I have never found these two objectives so heartrending as they are in Germany today. Here were a people, courteous and friendly, simple and kind in so many of the common things of life. Often I would look about me, in a restaurant and on the street (this after I had been in Berlin for several weeks and had experienced repeated surprises which awakened disappointment, dismay, or apprehension)—and always, at such times, the thought would come: "Do these people realize that they are being led straight toward another war? Do these quiet and orderly people want war? Is it not all a crime, a terrible crime against the German people themselves?"

I met many Germans who were afraid that war would come eventually; who feared war greatly and who felt as impotent to prevent it as

children. Many, too, who now regarded war as inevitable. These Germans, however, did not wear the uniforms or any one of twenty or thirty insignia of the National Socialist movement. They were voiceless and powerless. They had nothing to say in a positive way about anything the regime might do. They have nothing to say, many millions though they may be, because they possessed neither the foresight, courage, nor moral adhesion to defend the republic and strike back long ago while yet there was time. Although unknown hundreds of Socialists have been killed or have died from brutal attacks since the Nazi revolution, not one Socialist minister in any German state (duly elected by a majority of his constituents) chose to die in his official chair rather than abdicate to unconstitutional force. Sometimes one wondered whether the German people as a whole deserved any better than they have received, yet one wanted to believe that they did.

One must seek, then, for a considerable part of the explanation for Hitler's amazing rise to power in the character of the German people. Their inherent love of order is at once one of their greatest virtues and one of their gravest faults. Because they prize orderliness so highly their respect for authority is abnormally great. Because respect for authority lies engrained deep

in their nature they are submissive as no other great nation, save the Russians, has been. Because they love order they have also a child-like weakness for martial display and military pomp. Germany is the only country in Europe where hundreds of civilians, suddenly forgetting their ordinary errands and occupations, march with every band. They follow the band every day as it passes up Unter den Linden—men, women, and children, heads up, arms swinging, as unconsciously in step as soldiers—several hundred of them on either sidewalk. Most Frenchmen wouldn't even stand still to stare, let alone follow along. Edgar Mowrer again was right when he said: "Germany follows the band." You see evidences of all these qualities about you everywhere in Germany's everyday existence. They are as significant as the continual verbal arguments between Paris taxi-drivers. Individualist France—regimentary Germany.

Likewise the German constitutes a baffling mixture of idealism and brutality. By turns he worships beauty, by turns he is long-suffering and by turns he explodes. The Nazi movement in all its phases is merely another typically Teutonic explosion. Such explosions mark an almost irresistible return to force. When all other avenues seem to fail the German must use his physical strength.

Even in German poetry this characteristic will crop out. When, in Goethe's "Erlkoenig," the elf is trying to persuade the child to accompany him into the woods, he says:

> Und bist du nicht willig
> So brauch' ich Gewalt.
> (If you are not willing,
> Then I shall have to use force.)

Or again, in an old German verse which is familiar to almost every child in school, one finds these words:

> Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein,
> So schlag' ich dir den Schädel ein.
> (And if you won't be my brother
> Then I'll smash your skull.)

National Socialist Germany has repudiated the sensitive beauty and tenderness of the greatest German poet, Heinrich Heine. Heine was a Jew, and he sleeps, an exile of long ago, in Montmartre cemetery, Paris.

Curiously enough General Goering, Prime Minister of Prussia, used virtually the same expression as that of the above verse in an interview with a Dutch journalist in September. Germany, said Goering, is ready to be a friend or an enemy; either one or the other without

reservations. But the German people could never be half friend and half enemy. The rest of the world must choose between one state of positiveness and the other. In exactly the same spirit the Hitler Reich quitted Geneva at the drop of a hat. The Reich's Chancellor's speech that night was not so much an offer of peace as an ultimatum of peace. "Und bist du nicht willig . . . " was the tone of Hitler's address. One is compelled to admit that the German masses understand, and usually admire, that kind of language and that kind of table-thumping, whether foreign nations do or not.

This brings us to the conclusion (by no means original as far as these pages are concerned) that force is not alien to the German temperament; a conclusion for which history has already written its own confirmations.

If the people are malleable, if they cannot resist a concept of force, then what of the leaders? We are driven back to study the character and especially the temperament of the men who rule the Third Reich. Mussolini, too, has drilled his cohorts of marching men. Mussolini, too, has made speeches about the beauty of machine guns. The Italian dictator has also at times appeared to be leading Europe toward another war. Is Hitler a Mussolini?

Have the Nazis merely duplicated what the Fascists have done?

To answer the second question first, no person in Europe who is well informed on contemporary Italy and present-day Germany, could contend for a moment that Mussolini's program of patriotic awakening faintly approaches the militaristic program of the National Socialists. The Nazi system of militarization of an entire people is unprecedented in its breadth of conception, in its Teutonic thoroughness, and in its tremendous motive power. No one has ever seen children being given practice in throwing wooden hand grenades in an Italian schoolyard. No Italian university has ever opened up its curriculum to courses in poison gas, the filling of gas bombs, and all phases of military preparation. No Italian cabinet minister has ever publicly declared that "The germ of the military idea must be planted in the youth now growing up." Or, at least, in no such definite terms as these. Italy has produced no Professor Banse and no Oswald Spengler. In systematic cultivation of the fighting spirit (the Kämpferischer Geist) National Socialist Germany's achievement stands alone and unique.

As for Adolf Hitler, if he would equal—let alone surpass—Mussolini, he has yet to demonstrate a very great capacity for restraint. Perhaps

nothing has marked Mussolini more the statesman and less the opportunist demagogue than his demonstrated ability in recent years to hold Italian patriotism and enthusiasm at high pitch while exercising a moderating influence in international affairs. He has solidified the impression that he alone rides the Fascist horse; that the Fascist charger will never ride him; and that he is a statesman with whom other world leaders can negotiate.

It is not yet too late for Hitler to emulate Mussolini in this respect. There exist, however, at least three factors which make this most difficult to anticipate, if not downright improbable. The first is the now completely formed Nazi habit of the exercise of force and the terrific weight of a force-creed and a force-practice which today is in full swing of development in the Third Reich. The second is the fact that the German people have a much more real and much more justifiable grievance than the Italian people ever had. The third element of uncertainty lies in the temperament of the Reich's Chancellor Hitler himself.

That Hitler is a sincere man animated by a flaming patriotism and a great mysticism few people can deny, and none, I imagine, with fairness. But it is equally recognized throughout Germany that Hitler's nature is most explosive,

that he has certain blind spots and aversions which it is impossible for anyone to discuss with him rationally, and that he is subject to sudden fits of uncontrollable anger. Of late, declare men in Berlin who have occasion to know, the Chancellor has become extremely excitable and on occasion flies into fits of temper whose violence creates dismay.

There is the story, as yet untold, of Mussolini's unsuccessful eleventh-hour attempt to dissuade Hitler from bolting Geneva. On Friday, October 13, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin carried Il Duce's plea for restraint to the Reich's Chancellor. According to high authority the Italian envoy resorted to every counsel for prudence, reflection, and delay. But Hitler's sense of dignity and national respect had suffered too much. In the face of the repeated reasoning for caution, voiced in Mussolini's name, it is stated that the German Chancellor flew into a terrific rage. He shouted, roared, and stamped about, as his associates have seen him do when crossed on other issues. Twice the man who holds the destiny of 65,000,000 people in his hand came so near to hysteria that he burst into tears—as numerous people have seen him do before. Finding it completely impossible to curb the torrents of Hitler's anger or to continue the conversation in any rational way, the Italian

Ambassador finally hastened his departure, a discomfited and perturbed man. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this account, particularly if you have studied Adolf Hitler and his record closely and if you have heard him at the height of violence in many of his public speeches.

Is the world to expect that a man of this temperament, already well into his forties, will exercise restraint or renounce his own doctrines of the necessity for war, when that day comes when he has behind him—according to his own specified wish—"6,000,000 bodies trained to perfection by sport, all embraced with a fanatical patriotism, animated by the most vigorous offensive spirit"?

Nor does one find restraint to be a common or crowning virtue of the Nazi leaders around Hitler. Neither in Goering, Roehm, nor even in the brilliant and rapier-like Goebbels, when he is aroused. The very direct advice which Sir John Simon gave to Goebbels on the occasion of the Reich's Minister of Propaganda's only visit to Geneva is said to have sent Goebbels back to Berlin in a high state of fury. Goebbels' fiery report to Hitler made the decision which sent Germany clattering out of the League and the disarmament conference.

As for General Goering and his nine important titles, he has offered the world public examples of

the kind of restraint to be expected from a man who holds all of Prussia in his hand. Completely helpless before the cool insolence of Dimitroff in the Reichstag fire trial on November 4, Goering could scarcely be expected to remember that the man before him had been in prison for eight months, and manacled, day and night in his cell, for at least five of those months.

"You belong to the gallows," roared the Premier of Prussia, livid with rage. "But you'll have reason to fear that I'll catch you when you leave prison, you scoundrel!"

The old German verse refrain comes back again. "If you won't be my brother, I'll smash your skull!"

Are men like these to be trusted with the destinies of 65,000,000 people and the destiny of Europe? Is such fitful explosiveness a safe control over the vast Prussianized war machine now in the making and advanced far beyond the dreams of the outside world? Are the actions of a score or more prominent National Socialist leaders any manner of guarantee for the peace of Europe or the surety of their own future actions?

The searcher for facts and the man who wants to understand leaves Nazi Germany in the autumn of 1933 with a perplexed and troubled mind.

But such an observer is compelled to realize that the German people are very far from being all to blame. He is obliged to think more about their side of the case than ever before and to arrive at a few conclusions. After reporting some of these conclusions, we too shall conclude.

Chapter X

THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

"THE tragic thing about Germany today is that her demand for equal rights is *morally justified*, but to grant these moral rights to the Hitler regime means *the creation of an exceedingly grave menace* to European peace."

These are the words of a prominent foreign diplomat in Berlin. They cut through to the very heart of the world problem posed by National Socialism. How to make peace with a government and a dictatorial political party which is daily expending a large part of its energies and ingenuity in the realistic art of preparation for war? Having failed to grasp past opportunities to be entirely just with a Republican Reich, is it now safe for the other powers to attempt to go the limit in fair treatment with this new Third Reich? In the face of these questions even the most experienced diplomats and those statesmen of the greatest goodwill are beset by doubts and fears.

Let us admit that you cannot keep a great nation down. That merely brings us immediately

against harsh and distressing realities. For Nazi doctrines and Nazi deeds already harass world chancelleries with an equally perturbing problem. Can they afford to assume the risk —perhaps colossal—of helping to its feet a nation whose controlling elements are committed to eventual resort to force? Again, if we recognize the possibility that the peace makers of 1919 may yet become, in considerable measure, the war makers of the 1930's, then we must also admit that the men who are deliberately militarizing millions of German youths must also bear a tremendous share of responsibility before the world's eyes. It is the old saying that two wrongs, however stupendous, do not make a right.

We may chide France for having proved incapable of magnanimity in the days when magnanimity would in all probability have prevented Hitlerism and Militarism. We may regret the straddle-the-fence European policy of successive British governments. In the name of fairness to the German people we may make the full circle of deservedly apportioned blame, only to wonder in the end whether the German people, too, have been fair to themselves.

What confronts the statesmen of numerous important nations today, what confronts world public opinion, is not merely a steadily accen-

tuating dilemma. It is also a situation and a fact. Hitler declares that Nazi Germany wants peace at the very moment when Nazi Germany is busy, with an appalling systematization and efficiency, preparing its 65,000,000 people for perfected martial coordination such as has never existed before. This, in its logical sequence, can finally lead only to war. One of the most fateful mergers of the post-war years has been the merger of National Socialism with Militarism. There can be no doubt about this for any intelligent observer who has gone into the Third Reich in recent months and has carefully observed what is happening within its borders. Unchecked emotionalism, an almost fanatical patriotism and a calculatedly awakened nationalism—these are the consolidating forces which are turned loose upon an unprecedented plan for the moral and physical rearmament of Germany.

That the practical application of a gigantic scheme for "the mobilization of all German spirits" is in full progress cannot be doubted. This Gleichschaltung aller Geister has progressed amazingly far in less than one short year. As yet it has received nothing but the unreserved and unqualified official approval of Chancellor Hitler and his most intimate and powerful National Socialist lieutenants. If there exists any genuine desire to curb this mobilization or to

turn it into more pacific channels, then such a desire until now has not been transformed into action. You must judge the National Socialist dictatorship, in every field, not by its words alone but by its deeds and by its spirit.

Given this steady and incredible "mobilization of all spirits," the importance of one of the supreme doctrines of the Nazi Totalitarian or authoritarian state must not be overlooked. This doctrine has been repeatedly expressed by Herr Hitler and scores of others. But for as clear-cut and soldier-like an expression of it as any we may accept that of General Goering, spoken last July 22:

"From now on," declared the Premier of Prussia, "I demand from everybody, no matter who he is, that he devote his entire self to the authority of the National Socialist State. In the future there is to be only one authority, namely that of the State."

Or we may read the newly adopted principles of Friedrich Sieburg, for many years foreign correspondent of the once completely Republican *Frankfurter Zeitung* and author of the brilliant book *Is God a Frenchman?* Not so long ago, as I know from personal acquaintance, Dr. Sieburg was an avowed opponent of almost everything that the Nazi movement represents, but like uncountable thousands of others he has experi-

enced his whole-hearted conversion to the Nazi creed and the Totalitarian State. Just what is this conception of a state? And what is the conception of citizenship behind it? In his latest book, *Germany: My Country*, Dr. Sieburg says of the new Germany:

"The State is becoming total and is embracing all those private spheres in which human existence has hitherto detached itself from the State and allowed itself a certain degree of neutrality. This neutrality . . . is repudiated in Germany as weakness and often even as deliberate cowardice. There are to be no more private Germans. Each is to attain significance only by his service to the State and to find complete self-fulfillment in this service. Thus, to express it in more emphatic terms, there are to be no more mere human beings in Germany, but only Germans."

Or we may listen to one of the chief directors of the Gestapo (Geheimnistaatspolizei)—that newly formed Cheka of the Nazi State—talking to a young woman, taken into custody and grilled for nine hours, under suspicion for having been seen in the company of a foreign journalist.

"You must never permit yourself to forget that you are a German," says the Secret Police chief sternly. "Nor that, because you are a German, *your life belongs to the State.*"

Frenchmen, Englishmen, or Americans would do a great deal of thinking before they would accept that doctrine without serious reservations.

But to return to the excellent and thoroughly clear definition of Totalitarianism offered by Dr. Sieburg. Every German, under the National Socialist system, is to attain significance "only by his service to the State." That there is a great deal of idealism in a conception like this seems self-evident, nor is the sincerity of that idealism to be mistrusted, perhaps even in millions of cases. Nevertheless, one all-important question is immediately posed. To attain significance by unquestioning service to *what kind* of State?

Is the average earnest and good-intentioned German citizen to have anything to do with the set of ideals which dominate the policies and actions of this Nazi Totalitarian State? By their own political precepts, No. Is the average German citizen to have any voice or share in determining the methods of action of this Nazi State? No. That is to be left to a small group of supposedly enlightened leaders of the National Socialist movement. Is the average German to enjoy the free right to criticize this superior State-like deity or to protest against it? No more so than he now can in a press-strangled land, where liberty of opinion is ruthlessly stifled. Is the average German to be permitted to exercise a

certain direct influence in order to guide this supreme structure, which he has been ordered to serve blindly and at the expense of constituting a "human being"? Can he exert any real influence as to whether this State Deity shall be God or Mammon? Again, No! Not only does this Nazi Totalitarian State repudiate the average German's neutrality, as Dr. Sieburg says. It also repudiates his selective intelligence.

And what has this to do with the Prussianization and militarization of the Third Reich? Right here is where the very concept of the National Socialist State may one day menace the peace of the world.

It means quite clearly that the Nazi dictatorship on one hand is telling 65,000,000 German people "Your life belongs to the State," while on the other hand Hitlerism is preparing to do with these 65,000,000 lives as it sees fit. It means that a political philosophy of complete self-abnegation and utter obedience has been devised, among other things, as the absolutely necessary adjunct to the moral and physical rearmament of an entire nation. Without such an alluring and self-oblivious political philosophy the militarization of German youth, of German universities, of professors and preachers and men of science, might very well fail. With such a political philosophy how can it fail? Harness a people's

minds; put blinders on them so that they can only look straight ahead and then not too far; cultivate their muscular force and train them to respond as one animal to the crack of a governmental whip—do these things and they will pull a very heavy load. They will pull it or collapse. They will do one or the other because, long ago, they abandoned all recourse to individual choice. In the realm of military preparedness nothing could be of more importance.

Psychologically, spiritually, and physically the Nazi dictatorship is designed, par excellence, to create a nation of warriors and a civilian population trained to follow blindly in their wake. Neutrality is repudiated as weakness. Logically so and tragically so. Every German must achieve significance only by his service to the State.

What kind of State, Chancellor Hitler?

After all, what kind of State must inevitably evolve from 1,300,000 uniformed and highly drilled men? From 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Hitler Jugend, ardent and patriotic boys and girls, who are being preached the glories of war? From college graduates skilled in infantry drills, in military science and the newest devices in gas bombs? What kind of State must issue inexorably from actions such as these, from a carefully sown concept of force and an inflamed

patriotism? If National Socialist leaders do not think it safe to say, how can the outer world feel safe about it either?

In the face of such a Totalitarian State as this, one practical peace problem is raised. Is it still possible to persuade Hitlerism to curb, radically and effectively, the militarization of Germany? As the counterpart to a ten-year guarantee of European peace, would Chancellor Hitler agree to strip the uniforms from some 500,000 of his 1,000,000 marching men? Would he consent to the wholesale removal of all departments of military science from every German university, college, and technical school? Would Hitler abolish those decrees which put professors and diplomats in training camps? Would he stop the systematic enrolment of the majority of all Protestant clergymen under thirty-five years of age in the stormtroopers' battalions? Or halt the blacklisting of such young preachers as refuse to put on the Nazi uniform?

Would Hitler clean house wherever Prussianization of youth is going on? If the other powers were to offer Germany equal rights, the privilege of manufacturing types of big cannon, heavy tanks, and all the rest—if such fundamental concessions as these were made to Berlin, with the doubling in numbers of the Reichswehr

regular army, why should not counter-correctives of this sort be expected from the Third Reich in return? Does not all this Nazi militaristic program constitute another set of "rights" (to give them the prettiest name), which are unequaled anywhere else in the world?

Unfortunately the National Socialist spokesmen of today steadfastly refuse to consider the entire set of facts, which have been presented in these pages, as having anything whatever to do either with militarism or with rearmament. They insist, bluntly and blindly, that it would be unthinkable even to remove the uniforms from 200,000 brownshirt stormtroopers as part of an international diplomatic attempt to preserve the peace of Europe. Prussianization and the Nazi doctrine of regimented force are purely internal measures. They concern no one but the German government and the German people. They are as pacifist in their intent as football teams. Only an astonishing reversal of National Socialist policy, only an almost miraculous shift toward conciliation and common sense on the part of Hitler and his coleaders would make compromises possible on these dangerous but essential principles. As the sands in the hourglass of 1933 drop swiftly away there is no sound reason to believe that the crying need for this vital compromise will be listened to in Berlin.

The Hitler movement, then, has increased inestimably the probability of another war in Europe at any time in the next five to fifteen years. (We say five to fifteen years where many would say three years or five, but in an effort to avoid possible overstatement and to express both the most hopeful and most conservative view.) If such a war should come with National Socialism in control of Germany, it must not be overlooked that certain members of the Hohenzollern dynasty may play an important part in it. The Crown Prince and some of his brothers already wear Nazi uniforms, review troops, and receive the plaudits of scores of thousands of Hitler's followers in present-day Germany. All of the vital accoutrements of the old imperial order have been reinstalled beyond the Rhine. The old order itself waits hopefully at the door; perhaps too hopefully.

However that may be, the Prussian system of authority-with-the-goosestep is of infinitely more importance than the emblem which it may choose to wear. We may confine ourselves to the path which is being trod and to the direction in which it leads. As has been stated, foreign observers within Germany today are virtually unanimous in the conviction that present National Socialist policies, if pursued in their present methods and toward their present goals,

cannot fail to precipitate another European catastrophe sooner or later.

In this respect one point should be made clear to that wide public opinion abroad which still wants to be fair to the German people. The foreign observers who have been driven regretfully to this conviction constitute, in overwhelming majority—at least as far as Americans and British are concerned—a group of men who, for twelve years, have been wholeheartedly sympathetic to the plight of the German people under the Versailles treaty. I did not meet a single Anglo-Saxon journalist in Berlin whose original sympathies for the German case had not been severely alienated, if not completely killed, by the methods and motives of the National Socialist movement. A number of these British and American correspondents are of German descent. Many of them have resided in Germany from eight to twenty years. Almost all of these men have written in strong support of the German people's case since the days of the Ruhr occupation. They were the best and perhaps the most influential friends that Germany had. When a government succeeds in alienating the best foreign friends that it has possessed, something must be wrong. These former friends say today that Hitlerism is leading toward war. After ten or fifteen years of intimate

acquaintance with Germany their opinion is not to be underestimated.

But must Europe, chained to the reckless destiny of a new Germany, founder inevitably in another war?

Dark as the outlook is admitted to be, some of the best minds of Europe still refuse to be completely defeatist or completely resigned. Few, if any, of these men now entertain real hope that Nazi Germany can be persuaded to renounce definitely—and the word *definitely* is of supreme importance—that militarist god which she has enthroned and now serves, worships, and acclaims. Many of them, however, still envisage certain possibilities which might alter Hitlerism's ominous course.

One such possibility would be the firm common action of the French, British, and Italian governments—with the always-problematical adhesion of Great Britain an absolutely essential element. Failing British support of France, and counting upon England's traditional balance-of-power aloofness toward the continent, then Paris and Berlin threaten to be left to attempt to settle their differences between themselves. As this is written, direct Franco-German negotiations are beginning and, whatever happens, their outcome can scarcely fail to be momentous. These, then, are possibilities one and two.

A third possibility for solution of the German-European war menace should not be entirely disregarded. Cruel as it may seem, any potentiality of a European war for a number of years to come would be eliminated if the Nazi Reich suffered a terrific and unprecedented economic collapse. The same situation might result from the steady swing of National Socialist economic policies toward radically Left-wing solutions. Among the Nazi leaders are many dedicated to exceedingly Left industrial and agricultural experiments. If their counsels and methods prevail, the German industrial giant might conceivably be amputated and crippled within a very few years' time. Then German economic disorder and the need for readjustment would impose a peace policy as a necessity in the Third Reich, as such a policy has been imposed in recent years upon Soviet Russia. In extremely realistic language, the Nazi economic extremists might just possibly tie up their own machinery, complicate their own success, and save Europe in the process. This is risking a long look ahead in regard to a great country's situation, where nothing can safely be predicted three weeks in advance. Nevertheless it is not impossible that economic chaos inside Germany might one day save Europe from another war.

But to return to the immediately practical problem, the world must watch as France and Hitler Germany endeavor in these next few months to reach some kind of arrangement between themselves. Can Paris and Berlin succeed in signing even a limited-term peace treaty, as things are now? That is a question which no one in Europe today could pretend to answer. Only time will tell. If a Franco-German agreement is reached, will it mean that all danger of ultimate war has been removed? That would depend, in very large measure, upon its terms. So long as National Socialism retains complete freedom to maintain its vast program for militarization and Prussianization of a people who are prone to accept these things, a great many people will feel compelled to harbor serious reservations about the future solidity of European peace. I shall pronounce no judgments in advance, but it may be prudent to report here the words of one of the most experienced and wisest diplomats in present-day Europe. What he said is simply this. "A Franco-German peace agreement, arrived at now, will almost certainly contain the seeds of a future and more destructive war." This is another way of expressing Robert Dell's verdict—"a peace to end peace."

Or, one may say, there still remains the Versailles Treaty, which might be revised. This

avenue, too, should not be overlooked. As to whether a European effort to revise the peace treaties and partially satiate Germany's demands for returned territory would do any permanent good, opinions differ widely. Obviously, the treaty revisers would not give the Third Reich the whole of Austria, yet that is precisely what Hitler—Austrian by birth—says very definitely he intends one day to get; that this is what the German people must have. It is seriously to be feared that even treaty revision, with all its reopening of old sores and rewhetting of old desires and unquenched greeds, would scarcely do more than heighten Europe's geographical and ethnological chaos, while sating but temporarily the appetites which now wear brown uniforms and require the Hitler salute.

In this fashion the world is given pause before the great and momentous uncertainties which have been thrown out across the entire face of a troubled Europe by the rise of National Socialism and its establishment of a dictatorial autocracy over 65,000,000 German people. The world will wait while a few statesmen wrestle with forces, prejudices, and selfish desires and ambitions which seem infinitely greater than they are themselves. The choice of Hitlerite Germany, reckoned by facts, figures, and actions alone, seems fatally projected toward a final war. Will

the new Germany—this throbbing, marching, emotional, regimented, and mystical new Germany—still listen to the voice of reason? Or is it already too late?

The happiest denial which the facts set forth in these pages could possibly provoke would be the historical proof, in two years or ten, that they do not mean what every rational deduction today makes them appear inevitably to mean.

I feel compelled to repeat here that one sentence quoted at the beginning from the writings of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank under the National Socialist dictatorship:

"Above all, a process of *moral education* must be inaugurated if wars are to be avoided in the future."

There exists today a Nazi system of moral education in Germany. It does not lead toward the great hope and the greater need which Dr. Schacht has cited.

Does the new Germany of Adolf Hitler, of National Socialism, and the Totalitarian State want that kind of moral education? Can it still be persuaded to accept "a process of moral education" intended, not to implant "the germ of the military idea in the young now growing

up," but to scotch the inclination toward future wars?

Go to National Socialist Germany today, observe and enquire for yourself with all good will but with Teutonic thoroughness, and it is clear enough whether the Hitler Reich means eventual peace or eventual war. Will Adolf Hitler and his new Germany persist in wanting ultimate war?

Chapter XI

IF WAR, WHAT ABOUT AMERICA?

AS Americans we need ask ourselves but one final question. If the wholesale militarization of Germany under the National Socialist dictatorship now poses the problem of peace or war in Europe as it has never been posed since 1919, how does this grave situation threaten to effect 125,000,000 American people in these crucial years immediately ahead of us? Can we remain indifferent as the Old World drifts nearer to self-destruction? Although another vast catastrophe is not yet inevitable it must nevertheless be recognized as a distinct and perhaps a not very distant possibility. Can the United States government, in such an eventuality, keep from becoming embroiled? And in any case and come what may, shall we be as unprepared as in 1914, or shall we have a foreign policy and a program designed to meet the imperative and momentous exigencies which are likely to arise?

In such few words as these the issue may be stated and to any American observer who is

acquainted with Europe today the issue would appear to be one of supreme importance. Perhaps the most common and most easily justifiable criticism launched against American foreign policy in general is that, save for some few notable exceptions like the Monroe Doctrine, it has been more of an improvisation than a definite policy. Foreign governments have usually had a very hazy idea of what the course of American action would be until after a crisis has occurred. Even the great moral weight of American public opinion has been thrown into the breach much more often after an event than before it. Yet before the event American public opinion and American governmental opinion might have exercised a very considerable sobering or preventative influence.

Before tragic developments, such as Nazi Prussianization may well forecast, a definite American policy could not fail to be of twofold value. It could scarcely fail to cast a certain beneficial oil upon the fevered surface of European political effervescence. To an even greater degree it would dissipate the uncertainties which are bound to hang over the future welfare of the American people so long as a continental hurricane brews and they remain without any chart for the storm. One statement may safely be made in regard to the war menace in Europe.

If by any chance the day should come when both England and the United States were drawn into another European conflict, then in no small measure the blindnesses and neglects of these two governments—dating from October, 1933, to the time of any future declaration of war abroad—would be deeply to blame. The British people and the American people are still masters of their fate. No mortal can tell for how long they may continue to remain so. Nor can any intelligent man assert that, in the face of the mounting danger of a European conflagration, they can continue indefinitely to be so.

It is outside the province of an American foreign correspondent to attempt to formulate definite policies or to offer positive solutions. But one cannot walk in the midst of a Herculean code of military conduct, one cannot see war-in-the-making on an unprecedented and almost terrifying scope, without pondering what this creature from Mars may one day mean to his own people. If man is to live he must ask himself what can be done—what can America do? For the lesson of three heartbreaking years of American diplomatic patience, from 1914 to 1917, stands out all too starkly and too clearly. "We will keep out of war!" repeated day after day and week after week is not enough to keep any great nation out of war. Especially if fac-

tories and farms stretched across three thousand miles of continent have been busily engaged, these three years, in contributing to throw the weight of a final decision in that war. Especially if hundreds of millions of American dollars have been staked and jeopardized for the sake of an ultimate victory for one set of combatants.

As Europe faces a war-clouded future, then, the American issue seems plain enough. If a war should break out abroad at any time in the next decade either the United States will become involved, sooner or later, or she will refuse steadfastly and doggedly to become involved. Furthermore, if it is the overwhelming desire of the American people not to enlist as belligerents in another European conflict, then certain very specific and far-reaching precautions must be taken in advance. Very few governments have ever improvised their way either to safety or to honor. It is not too much to say that the time is fast coming, if indeed it has not already come, when both the American government and the American people must begin to chart their course before the agitated barometer of a hapless Europe. The United States needs a foreign policy premised upon the possible outbreak of another European war.

Of course, there is reason to expect that Washington officials may already have explored

this terrain as a theoretical problem. But it is usually safe to say that any American administration will trim its sails, when an emergency comes, in considerable measure according to the tone and strength of public opinion. What is really important, therefore, is that American public opinion should begin to concern itself over the possible repercussions of a clash abroad. The American people must ask themselves, "What shall we do if Europe goes to war?" Very often, indeed, the man who is susceptible to pneumonia never contracts pneumonia because he has recognized his exposed condition in advance. It is an encouraging sign, then, to observe that a few of our leading metropolitan newspapers have begun to pose this question of neutrality in their editorial comment, while civic organizations like the Foreign Policy Association are enlisting qualified speakers to discuss the same problem. An informed public opinion may function as one of the greatest safety valves of any government and the United States is particularly fortunate in that it possesses innumerable institutions designed, not for propaganda, but to inform the public in an honest and disinterested manner.

All the more reason exists, however, to consider frankly what the American government may or may not do if hostilities should pre-

cipitate a European crisis at any moment in the next decade. At the cost of vast losses and acute individual suffering we have somehow survived a decade of blind optimism. As a consequence people everywhere are better prepared to face realities than they once were. They are readier to believe that disasters must be foreseen in order to be warded off. This is no more true economically than it is in the field of international politics. As Americans we should be ripe for realistic policies and the best form of realism lends itself to idealistic ends.

Very few international experts believe that the United States can rely successfully upon a neutrality policy which is no more than a replica of the Wilson policy between 1914 and 1917. If that kind of neutrality is not enough when cannon reverberate across Europe, then what kind of neutrality can we elect? I shall hazard certain suggestions, not with any claims that these measures would be sufficient in themselves but rather to point out a few avenues of action which are open to us. I am merely convinced that the more this question is debated the more assurance we shall have of arriving finally at sound and sane conclusions.

As a starting point it appears accurate to state that the temper of the American people today registers overwhelmingly against any govern-

mental action which is likely to necessitate the dispatch of a second American Expeditionary Force across the Atlantic. Our people do not feel that it is their duty to fight for Europe's salvation. In other words, if a war should come in Europe, Americans want to remain neutral. This being the case, what must we do to remain neutral? First, we must seek out the causes of the failure of the Wilsonian neutrality policy. After that we must formulate a more positive and a more shock-proof program of neutrality.

One great reason for Wilson's failure lay in the fact that he was trying to pursue two diametrically opposed policies at the same time. The American government was declaring its firm neutrality while insisting upon the maintenance of our traditional freedom of the seas. It seems patent that no great power can attempt to retain unlimited world trade, so long as modern submarine warfare exists, unless it is prepared in the end to fight in order to retain that same freedom of trade. At the very moment when the choice becomes "abdicate or fight," neutrality collapses like a punctured balloon. That kind of neutrality must invariably constitute a splendid balloon forever exposed to a catastrophic deflation. In another European conflict, therefore, I should say that the United States must be prepared to renounce her over-

rated freedom of the seas policy if she does not want to become an eventual combatant. We must be prepared, first of all, to curb our European trade temporarily for the duration of any war on the continent.

But it is quite possible to make this renunciation a real force toward perpetuating peace and toward preventing or localizing a future war. Implement the Kellogg Pact with a provision for an economic and financial boycott against an aggressor nation and let Washington adhere to such an amendment—then any European government which launches an armed attack would be confronted with the hard restraining fact that she must wage a war bereft of all possibility of receiving either material supplies from the United States or American loans to enable her to continue the destruction. Firstly, the absence of all support from us ought certainly to delay and possibly prevent a hasty declaration of war. In any case, such an American boycott could not fail to limit and to localize the scope of any conflict which might ensue.

The United States, then, might greatly fortify its policy of positive neutrality by renouncing the freedom of the seas and by subscribing to an economic and financial boycott. But this, in fact, would mean that we had renounced war loans, either in part or in entirety, and that we

had washed our hands of war profits altogether. We would not have factories buzzing throughout the land as they buzzed from 1914 to 1917. We should be deprived of increased employment, longer working hours, and higher wages. It would cost the average American citizen a concrete sum in dollars and cents for the privilege of contributing to world peace and enjoying the security of neutrality. Are the American people prepared to sacrifice that much? It would seem difficult for anyone conversant with American idealism to claim that the citizens of the United States would not consider such a course. If, by any chance, they will have nothing of it, then the opposite alternative of eventually becoming a belligerent would appear almost unavoidable.

But to carry this thought to its logical conclusions we must envisage the obstacles involved. Just recently I have learned that a Polish order of $10,000,000 or more for war supplies was offered to a large American corporation; with what result I do not know. Undoubtedly this is only one of a number of similar demands for orders which have already been made from Europe and their number and importance are bound to increase as Europe drifts nearer to war. Shall we continue to permit our slow uppick in economic activity to depend in part

upon European preparation for another war? Shall we allow our industrial recovery to rest, in some measure, upon outside influences which run contrary to the perpetuation of peace? Or shall we demand of our governmental and of our industrial leaders a course of action which may make the tempo of American recovery somewhat slower but will be designed to prevent the American system from holding any "stocks" in a future war?

There exist numerous uncertainties. Alongside these uncertainties, however, we may count upon one great certainty. This certainty is the fact that the preservation of peace is a practical problem, that it cannot be achieved by halfway measures, and that it inevitably must require definite and material sacrifices from all nations and all citizens concerned. For ourselves (to keep out of another European conflict) Americans must sacrifice dollars—or eventually they will have to sacrifice men.

The American people must one day decide for themselves not only what their course of action in the event of another European war must be. They must also decide what positive and personal sacrifices they are prepared to impose upon themselves both for the sake of neutrality and for the sake of eliminating the disastrous consequences of a major conflagration.

The more this problem is discussed and debated now and the sooner our government is assisted toward arriving at a definite antiwar policy, the safer we all shall be. If we are to remain neutral, we must be prepared to pay a very definite price for our American neutrality.